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1. INTRODUCTION 
Federal Indian law is dynamic, and though few outside the field 
acknowledge it, cutting edge. 1 In the last few decades, coinciding with 
the rise of Indian gaming,2 Indian tribes, individual Indians, and In-
1. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, 
JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 1 (5th ed. 2005) ("The body of 
federal Indian law-expressed in separate volumes of the United States Code 
and the Code of Federal Regulations, in some 380 treaties, in hundreds of opin-
ions of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, in thousands of cases, and 
in scores of law review articles-is expanding rapidly."); Lawrence R Baca, 
Thirty Years of Federal Indian Law, FED. LAw., Apr. 2005, at 28, 29 ("Since 1976, 
the Supreme Court has decided more than 100 cases involving Indian law."); Eliz-
abeth A. Kronk, Hundreds of Nations, Millions of People: One Senior Judge on the 
Federal Bench, FED. LAw., July 2005, at 16, 16. 
2. A few Indian tribes began gaming operations as early as the late 1960s, but the 
expansion of Indian gaming did not begin with great intensity until Congress 
enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988. STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & 
KATHRYN RL. RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COM. 
PROMISE 7-8 (2005) [hereinafter LIGHT & RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL Sov-
EREIGNTY]; see also Brief of Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa 
Indians et aI. as Amicus Curiae, at 3-5, Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. 
State, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004) (No. 122830) (discussing the history of the 
Michigan Indian tribes' gaming operations); see generally Steven Andrew Light & 
Kathryn RL. Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty: Three 
Frameworks for Developing Indian Gaming Law and Policy, 4 NEV. L.J. 262 
(2003) [hereinafter Light & Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty]; 
Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: The Consent Principle and Tri-
bal-State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 25 
(1997); Kevin K Washburn, Federal Law, State Policy, and Indian Gaming, 4 
NEV. L.J. 285 (2003); Kevin K Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 
1 WYo. L. REV. 427 (2001) [hereinafter Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian 
Gaming]. 
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dian-owned businesses have acted far beyond the direction of statutes 
and agency promulgations. Indians and Indian tribes are too ener-
getic and resourceful to wait for Congress or the agencies to make pol-
icy decisions.3 Federal Indian law and policy is no longer driven by 
Congress, the bureaucracy, or even the states.4 Indian tribes lead the 
way and the rest have to catch up.5 It appears that Congress and the 
Executive Branch may never catch Up,6 having already adopted a re-
actionary approach to deal with Indian issues by relying more on case-
specific legislation7 and claims adjudication in the administrative 
courts.8 Now that Indian actors lead the way, there may never be an-
other time when Congress or the President makes broad, sweeping 
changes to federal Indian policy.9 
3. See, e.g., Bill O'Brien & Christine Finger, Tribes Jointly Pursue Plans for Romu-
lus Casino: 1994 Agreement Allows Groups to Share Profits, TRAVERSE CITY RE-
CORD-EAGLE (Mich.), June 28, 2005, http://www.record-eagle.coml2005/jun/ 
28casino.htm. 
4. Cf. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 
271-72 (2005) ("Professor Joseph Kalt, codirector of the Harvard Project on 
American Indian Economic Development at the Kennedy School of Government, 
reported: 'We cannot find a single case of sustained economic development where 
the tribe is not in the driver's seat ... .'" (quoting Economic Development on 
Indian Reservations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Congo 
6-7 (1996»). 
5. ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GoLDBERG & REBECCA TSOSIE, AMERICAN INDIAN 
LAw: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xv 
(4th ed. 2003) ("During the past decade, tribal governments and their legal sys-
tems have expanded in size and sophistication and their business enterprises, 
particularly in the gaming industry, have exploded. Tribes have become increas-
ingly self-sufficient and far less reliant on the federal government both for fund-
ing and technical assistance."); cf. Edwin Kneedler, Indian Law in the Last Thirty 
Years: How Cases Get to the Supreme Court and How They are Briefed, 28 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 274,279-80 (2003) ("So much of the law concerning Indian tribal 
sovereignty has been judge made. The Court has had many decisions over the last 
twenty or thirty years articulating the scope of tribal sovereignty where there has 
not been any act of Congress or treaty on the subject, and all the Court could rely 
upon were its own prior decisions."). 
6. See MARK TuSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 22 (2003) ("Partisan polar-
ization and divided government have obvious implications for the lawmaking pro-
cess: Only initiatives that have bipartisan support are likely to be enacted, and 
polarization makes it difficult to assemble a bipartisan majority for major policy 
initiatives. "). 
7. See, e.g., S. 113, 109th Congo (2005) (modifying the date as of which certain tribal 
land of the Lytton Rancheria of California is deemed to be held in trust); H.R. 
680, 109th Congo (2005) (directing the Secretary ofInterior to convey certain land 
held in trust for the Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah to the City of Richfield, Utah, 
and for other purposes). 
8. E.g., Turning Stone Casino Resort, No. 04-1000 (OSHRC Nov. 1,2004),21 OSHC 
(BNA) 1059 (Apr. 18, 2005); Miccosukee Resort & Convention Ctr., 9 O.C.A.H.O. 
1114,2004 WL 3312070 (2004); San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 
No. 138, 2004 WL 1283584 (2004). 
9. As Justice Thomas stated, "Federal Indian policy is, to say the least, schizo-
phrenic." United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
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As an institution, federal courts are reactionary.l0 They cannot 
decide an issue without a party bringing suit in the first instance. 
And, though it is the Court's job to interpret the Constitution, in the 
Indian cases the Court has little or no constitutional text to interpret. 
Indian tribes in recent decades have outpaced the law in many ways. 
Through their commitment to tribal self-determination, Congress and 
the Executive have opened the door-and tribes have finally sprinted 
through. ll Each tribe is a laboratory for self-determination,12 busi-
ness ideas,13 and intergovernmental relations. 14 As a result, the fed-
ring). See also Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1069, 1117 (2004) ("lFJederal Indian policy has been highly cyclical, moving 
from extreme measures to assimilate Indians and end Indian tribal autonomy to 
the eventual resurrection of Indian tribes and implementation of policies meant 
to foster Indian self-government. These wild swings in federal Indian policy do 
not speak well of federal control." (footnotes omitted)}. Numerous scholars have 
harshly criticized-and with good reason-federal Indian policy choices made by 
Congress and the Executive Branch. See Sandra L. Cadwalader, Preface to THE 
AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880s, at ix 
(Sandra L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr., eds., 1984); Bethany R. Berger, In-
dian Policy and the Imagined Indian Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 103 
(2004); Raymond Cross, The Federal Trust Duty in an Age of Indian Self-Determi-
nation: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TuLsA L. REV. 369, 372-73 (2003); 
Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian 
Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 920-39 (1999). 
10. See TuSHNET, supra note 6, at 93 ("The Supreme Court can aggressively exercise 
the power of judicial review only when its members think that government's 
power is narrow (relative to the views of legislators) and members of legislatures 
think that broader exercises of power are both good public policy and constitu-
tionally permissible."}. 
11. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 4. 
12. See, e.g., Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Gouernance, 80 N.D. 
L. REV. 691, 725-29 (2004) (discussing ways for tribes to solve labor disputes 
through the exercise of self-determination). 
13. See John F. Petoskey, Doing Business with Michigan Indian Tribes, MICH. B.J., 
May 1997, at 440; Nancy Gohring, Tribes Weigh High Technology as an Economic 
Spark Plug, SEATTLE PosT-INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2003, at D1, auailable at 
2003 WLNR 2950609; Lorie Graham, Securing Economic Souereignty Through 
Agreement, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Oneida, N.Y.), Sept. 10, 2003, at A4; Mastin 
Paskind, Indian Role in New Mexico Business Changing, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 
15, 1995, at 10, auailable at 1995 WLNR 2032015. 
14. Some intergovernmental agreements between Indian tribes and states include, 
for example, the Intergovernmental Accord between the Tribal Leaders of the 
Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in the State of Michigan and the Governor of 
the State of Michigan Concerning Economic Development Interests, May 13, 
2005 (on file with author); Intergovernmental Accord between the Federally Rec-
ognized Indian Tribes in Michigan and the Governor of the State of Michigan 
Concerning Protection of Shared Water Resources, May 12, 2004, http://www. 
michigan.gov/documentslAccord_91058_7.pdf; Tax Agreement between the Little 
Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and the State of Michigan, Dec. 20, 2002, 
https:llwww.michigan.gov/documents/LTBB_Agreement_58762_7.pdf. One ex-
ample of an intergovernmental agreement between Indian tribes from both the 
United States and Canada is the Tribal and First Nations Great Lakes Water 
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eral courts have had fewer and fewer authorities to rely on to decide 
disputes, opening the door for the Supreme Court to exercise addi-
tional latitude in deciding Indian cases according to its own prefer-
ences.15 The anchor preventing the Court from taking the law into its 
own hands-the decades of federal law and policy dictating to tribes 
how to civilize themselves-has begun to rust away. 
And yet it is a dangerous time for Indian tribes. 
Observers of the current state of Indian affairs are aware that In-
dian gaming underlies nearly all of the major issues facing Indian 
Accord, Nov. 23, 2004, http://www.ltbbodawa-nsn.gov/announcementslTribal%20 
and%20First%20N ations%20Great%20Lakes%20Water%20Accord%20112304d. 
pdf. 
Other intergovernmental agreements are discussed by a variety of other au-
thorities. See JEFFREY S. AsHLEY & SECODY J. HUBBARD, NEGOTIATED SOVER-
EIGNTY: WORKING TO IMPROVE TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS (2004); AM. INDIAN LAw 
CTR., INC., COMM'N ON TRIBAL-STATE RELATIONS, STATE-TRIBAL AGREEMENTS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE STUDY (1981); CONFERENCE OF W. A'ITORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 500~1 (Clay Smith ed., 3d ed. 2004); P.S. Deloria & Rob-
ert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full Faith and Credit Agreements: The 
Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA. L. REV. 365 
(1994); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the 
Michigan Tribal-State Tax Agreements, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (2004); B. 
Kevin Gover et aI., Gover, Stetson and Williams, P.C., Tribal-State Dispute Reso-
lution: Recent Attempts, 36 S.D. L. Rev. 277 (1991); Joel H. Mack & Gwyn Good-
son Timms, Cooperative Agreements: Government-to-Government Relations to 
Foster Reservation Business Development, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 1295 (1993); W. Dale 
Mason, Tribes and States: A New Era in Intergovernmental Affairs, 28 PuBLIUS 
111 (1998); Daniel McCool, Intergovernmental Conflict and Indian Water Rights: 
An Assessment of Negotiated Settlements, 23 PuBLIUS 85 (1993); June M. Mick-
ens, Tribal and State Intergovernmental Child Support Agreements: The Process 
Behind the Contract, 9 AM. J. FAM. L. 11 (1995); David E. Wilkins, Reconsidering 
the Tribal-State Compact Process, 22 POL'y STUD. J. 474 (1994); see generally T. 
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE 
STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 140-42 (2002); AM. INDIAN LAw CTR., COMM'N 
ON STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS, HANDBOOK ON STATE-TRIBAL RELATIONS (1984); 
Frank Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?, 36 S.D. L. 
REV. 239 (1991); Note, Intergovernmental Compacts in Native American Law: 
Models for Expanded Usage, 112 fuRV. L. REV. 922 (1999). 
15. Edwin Kneedler stated: 
As we know, in the area of Indian law, a statute or treaty seldom sup-
plies a specific answer to a case. The relevant statute or treaty was typi-
cally adopted against the background of certain premises and 
understandings that, you can be fairly sure, were on the mind of the 
legislators or the treaty drafters at the time, but they didn't put it in 
writing. Because this is a Court that wants to find the answers in text 
rather than suppositions about what the drafters might have thought, 
there often is less to go on for a tribe or for the United States on behalf of 
tribes. As a result, there may actually have been more latitude for the 
Court in deciding Indian cases. 
Kneedler, supra note 5, at 278. 
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tribes in their relations with federal, state, and local governments.l6 
Huge ethics scandals involving high-ranking Republican leaders re-
late directly back to the use and abuse of Indian gaming revenues. 17 
Already huge land claims in New York and elsewhere are being af-
fected by the potential to use recovered lands for gaming operations. IS 
Gaming politics also interfere with the quest for federal recognition of 
historically oppressed Indian tribes. 19 State governments are looking 
to wealthy Indian tribes as cash cows to balance state budgets.2o The 
taking of land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes-one the most 
important provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA)-has 
been virtually shut down by the politics of (and derivative litigation 
involving) Indian gaming.21 Purely internal tribal matters, such as 
16. See generally Indian Gaming Regulation-Part I: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Indian Affairs, 109th Congo (2005) (statements of Dr. Steven A. Light and 
Kathryn R.L. Rand), available at 2005 WLNR 6576218. 
17. See David Brooks, Masters of Sleaze, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A23, available 
at 2005 WLNR 4396172; Frank Rich, Op-Ed, Get Tom DeLay to the Church on 
Time, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,2005, § 4, at 14, available at 2005 WLNR 5982822. 
18. See Charles V. Bagli, Deal by Wisconsin Oneidas May Clear Way for Casino, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at B5, available at 2003 WLNR 5666418; James C. McKin-
ley, Jr., Tribe and Pataki Near Deal on Land and Casino, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 
2003, at B1, available at 2003 WLNR 5246231; cf. Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. 
V. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005). 
19. See Roberto Iraola, The Administrative Tribal Recognition Process and the 
Courts, 38 AKRON L. REV. 867, 869 (2005); Recognition of Indian Tribes: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Congo (2005) (statement of Richard 
L. Velky, Chief, Schaghticoke Tribal Nation), available at 2005 WLNR 7437238. 
20. See In Minnesota as Elsewhere, Standing Up to Governors is a Good Idea, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY (Oneida, N.Y.), May 25, 2005, at A2, available at 2005 WLNR 
8288737 ("The solution in the minds of politicians and other special interest 
groups in the various states that contain Native nations is to go after whatever 
assets and revenues Indian tribal governments and member associations pres-
ently hold, and work to impose fees, taxes and any and all manner of tentacles 
upon such sovereign properties."); Glenn Coin, Casinomania: A Casino in Every 
Neighborhood, Hope for Money in Every Coffer, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, N.Y.), 
Jan. 12, 2003, at Al ("State legislators and the governor are betting that the 
largest expansion of gambling in state history will help resolve the state's fiscal 
crunch."); Amy Lane, State Looks to Indian Casinos to Add Revenue, CRAIN'S DE. 
TROIT Bus., Apr. 14, 2003, at 6 (discussing how Michigan Governor Jennifer 
Granholm and the Michigan Legislature "are looking to Michigan's American In-
dian tribes as potential revenue sources"). 
21. See, e.g., Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos V. Norton, 433 F.3d 852 (D.C. Cir. 
2006) (affirming taking of trust land for benefit of Pokagon Band of Potawatomi 
Indians); Carcieri V. Norton, 398 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005) (affirming taking oftrust 
land for benefit of Narragansett Indian Tribe); cf. Off-Reservation Indian Gam-
ing: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Congo (2005) (state-
ment of George T. Skibine, Acting Deputy Secretary for Indian Affairs, Dep't of 
the Interior) ("Finally, please keep in mind the fact that although the Depart-
ment has approved a trust acquisition for an Indian tribe it does not necessarily 
mean that the land has actually been taken into trust. For instance, the exis-
tence of liens or other encumbrances, or litigation challenging the Secretary's de-
cision may delay the proposed trust acquisition, often for years. "). 
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membership questions, are affected by gaming.22 Some wealthy tribes 
use gaming revenues in efforts to influence state elections.23 Finally, 
and most importantly, the backlash against Indian gaming feared 
since its early days is now here and flourishing. 24 
Concurrent with these recent events is the hyper-politicization of 
federal Indian law. Until the 1977 case of Delaware Tribal Business 
Committee v. Weeks,25 the Supreme Court treated Indian cases with a 
soft touch, preferring to leave the policy choices to Congress and the 
Executive, often invoking the political-question doctrine in refusing to 
review the constitutionality of Indian legislation.26 But the explicit 
rejection of the political-question doctrine in Weeks was a signal of a 
22. See Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, No. C 05-00093 MHP, 2005 WL 
1806368, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2005); Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948, 952 
(E.D. Cal. 2004); Ackerman v. Edwards, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517, 519 (Ct. App. 2004); 
Salinas v. Lamere, No. RIC 406255, slip op. at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 23, 2004) 
(on file with author); Jerry Bier, Indians' Lawsuit Targets Rancheria, FRESNO 
BEE, Jan. 30, 2005, at B3 (discussing Alvarado). 
23. See John M. Broder, Tribes Now Ready to Deal With Their New Governor, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at N18, available at 2003 WLNR 5666987 ("A small number 
of California's Indian tribes, by spending $12 million to defeat Mr. Schwarzeneg-
ger in the recall election, may have done more to ensure his victory than any 
other group, political analysts said. A total of $84 million was spent on the elec-
tion, with Indian gambling interests the single largest contributor."). 
24. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 336-38, 34~5; John Fredericks III, America's 
First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of American Indian Sovereignty, 7 
J.L. & POL'y 347, 406 (1999); Light & Rand, Reconciling the Paradox of Tribal 
Sovereignty, supra note 2, at 263-64; Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Vir-
tue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sover-
eignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'y & L. 381, 406-07 (1997); see also 151 
CONGo REC. S13389, S13390 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005) (statement of Sen. McCain) 
(noting a "backlash against Indian gaming generally"). 
25. 430 U.S. 73,83-85 (1977) (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and 
United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946), as examples of 
cases where the Court had reviewed congressional legislation in Indian affairs); 
see also United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980) 
("Thus, it seems that the Court's conclusive presumption of congressional good 
faith was based in large measure on the idea that relations between this Nation 
and the Indian tribes are a political matter, not amenable to judicial review. 
That view, of course, has long since been discredited in takings cases, and was 
expressly laid to rest in [Weeks)."); Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Res-
ervation Diminishment by Judicial, as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic 
Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393, 400 
n.41 (1995) (discussing judicial review of disputes between Congress and Indian 
tribes); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportu-
nities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 320 
n.30 (1997) (same); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine 
into the Constitution, 39 TuLSA L. REV. 247,255 (2003) (same); Comment, Federal 
Plenary Power in Indian Affairs after Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. 
REV. 235, 241 (1982) (same). 
26. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) ("Plenary authority 
over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the 
beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to 
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parallel phenomenon-the increasing tendency of the Court to make 
policy in the field of federal Indian law.27 The Court's entrance into 
the field of federal Indian policy is unwelcome, largely because the 
Court's policy choices are frequently uneducated in terms of their on-
the-ground impacts,28 but also because they are in direct contraven-
tion of explicit congressional and Executive Branch policy choices.29 
Professor Philip P. Frickey argued in 1990 that congressional in-
tent rarely provided much guidance to the Court in some of the cases 
this Article discusses.3o His analysis of the Court's cases did not 
touch upon the explicit statements of congressional and Executive 
Branch federal Indian policy.31 He proposed to "construct an an-
tiformalist alternative for federal Indian law scholarship by relying 
upon recent writings about practical legal reasoning."32 But more re-
cently, Professor Frickey declared that "it is exceedingly doubtful that 
... judicial solutions are among [the answers]" to the problem of 
American Indian law.33 
In contrast to Professor Frickey's earlier proposal, this Article pro-
poses that the Court should follow congressional and Executive 
be controlled by the judicial department of the government."); United States v. 
Holliday, 70 U.S. 407 (1865). 
27. See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 
119 HARv. L. REV. 431, 436 (2005) [hereinafter Frickey, (Native) American Excep-
tionalisml; Philip P. Frickey, Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships, and 
Commentary: The Malaise of Federal Indian Law Through the Lens of Lone Wolf, 
38 TuLSA L. REV. 5, 33 (2002); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehn-
quist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Val-
ues, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267,361 (2001) [hereinafter Getches, Beyond Indian Lawl; 
David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (1996) [hereinafter 
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontierl; Laurence, supra note 25; Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, Double Bind: Indian Nations v. The Supreme Court, 119 HARv. L. 
REV. F. 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/forumiissues/ 
119/dec05/singer.pdf; David E. Wilkins, The Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of'Im-
plied Repeals:' A Requiem for Indigenous Treaty Rights, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 
7 (1999); Jeannette Wolfley, Rice v. Cayetano: The Supreme Court Declines to 
Extend Federal Indian Law Principles to Native Hawaiians Sovereign Rights, 3 
AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'y J. 359 (2002). 
28. See Kronk, supra note 1, at 17 ("Indian Country and individual American Indians 
are suffering as a result of a federal bench that is 'ill-equipped' to handle cases 
involving federal Indian law."). 
29. Cf TuSHNET, supra note 6, at 95 ("The Court's strong theory of judicial 
supremacy meshes reasonably well with its generalized suspicion of legislators, 
interest groups, and politics because it explains to the Court why it is the proper 
forum for deciding again questions already addressed by politicians."). 
30. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic 
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1142 (1990). 
31. Id. at 1142-74. Professor Frickey also discussed the Indian Civil Rights Act, id. 
at 1157~0, 1163, and the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, id. at 1165~8. 
32. Id. at 1142. 
33. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 490. 
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Branch federal Indian policy when confronted with cases where no 
treaty, statute, or regulation controls, proposing a test based on lan-
guage contained in Justice Thomas's concurrence in United States v. 
Lara.34 Particularly in the area of federal Indian law known as inher-
ent tribal authority, as limited by the doctrine of implicit divesti-
ture,35 this new analytical structure would allow the Court to make 
decisions that more closely parallel the national interest as identified 
in explicit statements of federal Indian policy. 
Part II of this Article describes current federal Indian policy as ar-
ticulated in the collection of federal statutes, regulations, and other 
official pronouncements issued by Congress and the Executive since 
1970. These statements of federal Indian policy are supportive of tri-
bal self-determination, tribal economic development, and tribal court 
development. Part III argues that the Supreme Court has increas-
ingly acted as the leading federal Indian policymaker, leading to un-
welcome results for the federal government, Indians, Indian tribes, 
states, and non-Indians. The Court's federal common law cases often 
contravene express federal Indian policy. Part IV demonstrates that 
the unusual extraconstitutional status ofIndian tribes and the limited 
constitutional authority for federal government both open the door for 
the Court to act as a sort of plenary federal Indian policymaker. Part 
IV also describes and critiques the tenuous middle ground that a bare 
majority of the Supreme Court is willing to follow in relation to the 
plenary and exclusive authority of Congress to make federal Indian 
law and policy-a sort of preconstitutional federal power. Part V pro-
poses that the Supreme Court adopt, in part, Justice Thomas's propo-
sal for a "consistent-with-federal-policy" test, whereby the Court 
would not restrict tribal inherent authority absent express federal In-
dian policy to the contrary. This test relieves the Court of its uncom-
fortable and unwelcome policymaking activities in Indian cases and 
would produce results more indicative of federal Indian policy.36 
34. 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
35. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (defining "implicit divesti-
ture" as "that part of sovereignty which the Indians implicitly lost by virtue of 
their dependent status"). 
36. Other commentators have proposed numerous alternatives for the Court to con-
sider in its Indian law canon, but none in the vein of explicitly endorsing congres-
sional and Executive Branch federal Indian policy. See, e.g., ALEINIKOFF, supra 
note 14, at 145-49 (arguing for the expansion of nonmember political participa-
tion rights in tribal governments); Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision 
of "Domestic Dependent Nations" in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty 
Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 559-69 
(urging Congress or the Court to authorize Indian tribes to "nullify" laws or ac-
tions that infringe on tribal sovereignty); Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asym-
metry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 861 (2000) [hereinafter Laurence, 
Symmetry and Asymmetry] (blending notions of symmetry and asymmetry into 
federal Indian law); Robert Laurence, Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity 
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For the purposes of this Article, "federal Indian policy" refers to the 
express statements of policy or congressional findings contained in 
acts of Congress related to Indians, Indian tribes, and Indian tribal 
organizations. On occasion, Senate or House reports accompanying 
legislation will be discussed, but as a general matter, legislative his-
tory will not be considered "federal Indian policy." 
II. FEDERAL POLICY ON INDIAN AFFAIRS 
The political branches of the United States-the Executive and the 
Legislative-tend to make the policy decisions for the entire country 
on matters of broad national concern.37 In Marbury v. Madison,38 
Chief Justice Marshall stated that some cases are of a class that fed-
eral courts cannot review because "the[ir] subjects are political."39 
The Justices of the Supreme Court and the judges ofthe lower federal 
courts are not popularly elected, unlike the officials from the other two 
branches.40 In a perfect federal system, the federal courts would not 
be placed in the position of deciding what is best for the nation, and 
thus making federal policy. The Court is aware that it does not have 
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 68 N.D. L. REV. 657 (1992) (arguing for limited 
federal court judicial review of tribal court decisions); Robert Laurence, Martinez, 
Oliphant, and Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity Under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411 (1988) (same); Frank Pommersheim, Consti· 
tutional Shadows: The Missing Narrative in Indian Law, 80 N.D. L. REV. 743, 
757-58 (2004) (arguing for a constitutional amendment to provide for tribal 
rights); Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack 
on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641, 660-65 (2003) (arguing for a 
property-based approach to reviewing tribal sovereignty); Alex Tallchief Skibine, 
The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian Law and the Rehnquist Court: The 
Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003) (arguing that 
the Court should include tribal rights to self-government under the First Amend-
ment freedom-of· association rubric); Note, International Law as an Interpretive 
Force in Federal Indian Law, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1751, 1755 (2003) (arguing that 
the Court should apply international law principles to its Indian law cases). But 
see Peter Nicolas, American·Style Justice in No Man's Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895 
(2002) (identifying policy and legal problems in federal Indian law but offering no 
proposed solution). 
37. See David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern School Desegregation, and 
the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071, 1074-75 (2004) ("[LJife-tenured judges 
from across the political spectrum maximize the extent to which their decisions 
are driven not by personal policy agendas, but by the application oflaw to estab-
lished fact. Critical to the principle of judicial restraint, these standards help 
federal courts avoid intruding on the policymaking function and retain the credi-
bility they need to serve in our democracy as the arbiter of constitutional issues 
and the ultimate protector of constitutional rights." (citations omitted)). 
38. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
39. Id. at 166. 
40. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. III, § 1. 
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the institutional capacity that Congress and the Executive have to 
make intelligent and wise decisions about federal policy.41 
There are exceptions to the Court's reluctance to engage in explicit 
policymaking. For example, the Court adopted a substantive due pro-
cess analysis in Lochner v. New York,42 now hailed as a low point in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.43 In Lochner-era cases, the Court sec-
ond-guessed the political branches of the federal government in de-
claring hundreds of state economic regulations unconstitutiona1.44 
Another exception is more contemporary-federal Indian policy. 
In the last three decades, beginning in force around the mid-1970s 
with then-Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Moe v. Confederated Salish 
& Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,45 the Court has made 
broad statements of policy, often in contravention of explicit congres-
sional policy. These statements include determining how much inher-
ent tribal authority an Indian tribe retains;46 determining the 
territorial scope of Indian Country;47 and, perhaps most importantly, 
determining to what degree state law and authority extends into In-
dian Country.48 Most recently, the Court rejected an attempt by the 
Oneida Indian Nation to seek tax immunities from local governments 
on reservation lands on the policy basis that the Nation waited too 
long to assert its own governmental authority.49 The Court has 
shown an increasing disregard in certain instances for explicit con-
41. See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959) (citing McGrain v. 
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160 (1927)). 
42. 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). 
43. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (describing Lochner as a "nadir"); David E. Bernstein, Lochner's Legacy's 
Legacy, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2003); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 577,623-24 (1993); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon, and 
Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 244 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Leg-
acy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987). 
44. See Friedman, supra note 43, at 623 n.228. 
45. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
46. See, e.g., Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701, 704 (2003); Ne-
vada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 
645, 659 (2001); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997); Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555-57 (1981). 
47. See, e.g., Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520, 526-27 
(1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 351 (1998); Hagen v. 
Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 421-22 (1994). 
48. See, e.g., Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361.-u2; South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 
690-91 (1993); County of Yakima v. Confed. Tribes & Bands of the Yakima In-
dian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,513-14 (1991); Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.s. 163, 186-87 (1989); Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville 
Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 159.-u2 (1980); Moe v. Confed. Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes of the Flathead Reserv'n, 425 U.S. 463, 483 (1976). 
49. City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 125 S. Ct. 1478 (2005). 
HeinOnline -- 85 Neb. L. Rev. 132 2006-2007
132 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:121 
gressional statements of federal Indian policy. 50 This is a strange de-
velopment considering that until the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court 
often stated that congressional legislation and Executive Branch dis-
cretionary decisionmaking relating to Indian affairs were nonjusticia-
ble political questions.51 Congress and the Executive continue to 
make policy decisions in Indian affairs that apply to these cases,52 al-
though not the broad policy shifts made during the Roosevelt,53 Eisen-
hower,54 and Nixon Administrations.55 Despite this, the Court has 
plenty of relevant federal Indian policy guidance to follow. 
The reason why federal courts have stepped into the intervention-
ist role as policymaker is likely the overlooked debate over a missing 
constitutional source of authority for Congress and the President to 
make federal Indian legislation and policy in the first instance. 56 This 
50. See infra Part III. 
51. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,215 (1962); Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 
U.S. 705, 718 (1943); United States v. Santa Fe Pac. RR, 314 U.S. 339, 347 
(1941); Johnson v. Gearlds, 234 U.S. 422, 447 (1914); United States v. Sandoval, 
231 U.S. 28, 46-47 (1913); United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 445 (1903); 
Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903); United States v. Holliday, 70 
U.S. 407, 419 (1865); United States v. Gemmill, 535 F.2d 1145, 1147 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); Norvell v. Sangre de Christo Dev. Co., 519 F.2d 
370, 378-79 (10th Cir. 1975); cf United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 518 
F.2d 1298, 1300--01 (Ct. Cl.) (noting that "moral" claims brought in the Indian 
Claims Commission were nonjusticiable), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1016 (1975). 
52. See infra Part II. 
53. See CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 36-37 (discussing the broad 
policy changes of 1934's Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000), 
under the Roosevelt Administration). 
54. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 65-75 (noting the Eisenhower Administration's 
actions leading to the passages of House Concurrent Resolution 108, the official 
statement of the Termination Era). 
55. See CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 43 (discussing President 
Nixon's message to Congress announcing his support for tribal self-
determination). 
56. Compare United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (holding that Congress 
has "plenary and exclusive" powers "to legislate in respect to Indian tribes"), Rob-
ert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the In-
dian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor William's Algebra, 30 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 413 (1988), Robert Laurence, On Eurocentric Myopia, the Designated Hitter 
Rule, and "The Actual State of Things," 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 459 (1988), and Alex 
Tallchief Skibine, Integrating the Indian Trust Doctrine into the Constitution, 39 
TuLSA L. REV. 247, 248-49 (2003) (arguing that plenary power and the trust doc-
trine are interrelated "in a positive way"), with Lara, 541 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) ("The Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that 
gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty."), Milner S. Ball, 
Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (arguing that 
Congress does not have plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs), 
Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113 (2002) [hereinafter Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy 
Clause] (same), Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision 
Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 112 (1993) [here-
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debate has its roots in the Rehnquist Court's deep suspicion of con-
gressional and Executive authority,57 and its increasing focus on tex-
tual bases for exercises of federal power.58 The Rehnquist Court's 
in after Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest) (same), Robert N. Clinton, 
Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 841, 930 (1990) 
[hereinafter Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union), Robert N. Clinton, 47 
U. CHI. L. REV. 846, 859 (1980) (reviewing RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES 
YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 
(1980», Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal 
Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 
996-1001 (1981), Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to American Government, 31 
ARIZ. L. REV. 365 (1989), Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 
MINN. L. REV. 31, 35 (1996), Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of 
Canadian and United States Policy Toward Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643, 
714-15 (1991) (urging reversal of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903», 
Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st 
Century, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 217 (1993), Nell Jessup Newton, Fed· 
eral Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 
195 (1984), Prakash, supra note 9, at 1105-15, Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three 
Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. 
REV. 1149, 1168 (2003) (arguing that the Court never explained why the Indian 
Commerce Clause confers congressional plenary power), Joseph William Singer, 
Lone Wolf, Or How to Take Property by Calling It a "Mere Change in the Form of 
Investment," 38 TuLSA L. REV. 37 (2002) (criticizing congressional plenary power 
as applied), Catherine T. Struve, Tribal Immunity and Tribal Courts, 36 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 137, 171-72 (2004) (noting that congressional plenary power was imposed 
without tribal consent), Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law 
Decisions: Deviations from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial 
Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405, 452 (2003), Kevin K. Washburn, 
Lara, Lawrence, Supreme Court Litigation, and Lessons from Social Movements, 
40 TuLSA L. REV. 25, 42-43 (2004) (identifying the problem of a lack of textual 
support for congressional plenary power), Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not 
to Live with Eurocentric Myopia: A Reply to Professor Laurence's Learning to Live 
With the Plenary Power of Congress Over the Indian Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 
439 (1988), Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The 
Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurispru-
dence, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 219 [hereinafter Williams, The Algebra of Federal In-
dian Law), and Note, International Law as an Interpretive Force in Federal 
Indian Law, supra note 36, at 1755 n.26 (arguing that the Court tends to ignore 
the source of congressional plenary power). See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth 
Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1,80-81 
(2002) (describing as "uncertain" whether the Court will continue to validate con-
gressional plenary power); Frank Pommersheim, Lara: A Constitutional Crisis in 
Indian Law?, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 299 (2004); Frank Pommersheim, Is There a 
(Little or Not So Little) Constitutional Crisis Developing in Indian Law?, 5 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 271 (2003). 
57. See Herman Schwartz, The States' Rights Assault on Federal Authority, in THE 
REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT 155, 156-60 (Herman 
Schwartz ed., 2002). 
58. See Kneedler, supra note 5, at 278 ("First, this is a very text-oriented Supreme 
Court. It likes to decide cases on the basis of the language of the statute or the 
language of a treaty, rather than general principles."). But see Schwartz, supra 
note 57, at 159 (discussing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), as a 
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"states' rights" jurisprudence has also impacted the outcome of its In-
dian cases.59 
Without a clear textual source of authority in the Constitution for 
Congress or the Executive to make federal Indian policy, the Court is 
not constrained from entering into the realm of federal Indian poli-
cymaking,60 despite the fact that the Judiciary has "an even more in-
ferior constitutional pedigree than Congress has."61 For example, in 
other areas the Court is usually mindful, respectful, and pragmatic in 
separation-of-powers questions.62 But Indian tribes are "extraconsti-
tutional"63- they did not engage in the debates over the Constitution; 
they did not execute the Constitution; they were not included in the 
federal system at all.64 Chief Justice Marshall's strained solution to 
case where the Court could not "rely on any provision in the Constitution, so this 
time they used their own new conception of the constitutional 'framework' and 
'structure'"). 
59. See Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 27, at 344-45; Skibine, supra note 
36, at 27; see also Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 
ANNALS 81 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's concern with the 'dignitary 
interests' of states in its sovereign-immunity jurisprudence); Evan H. Caminker, 
State Sovereignty and Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers 
to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1995) (addressing problems 
with the Supreme Court's "anti-commandeering doctrine" as set out in New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992»; cf. generally Judith V. Royster, A Primer 
on Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than Answers, 30 TuLSA L.J. 61 (1994) 
(noting that tribal water rights cases necessarily bump up against states' water 
rights); cf. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224 (2004) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (noting that he would be willing to revisit Indian Commerce Clause cases 
and citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995». 
60. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. 
L. REV. 26, 29 (1994) ("The most interesting public law issues, however, tend to be 
those in which technological, social, or economic changes have rendered an equi-
librium unstable, or at least susceptible to movement. At that point, one of the 
institutions of government, often the Court, will in fact successfully shift public 
policy to render it more reflective of its own preferences."). 
61. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 436. 
62. See David C. Vladeck & Alan B. Morrison, The Roles, Rights, and Responsibilities 
of the Executive Branch, in THE REHNQUIST COURT, supra note 57, at 170, 176. 
63. Lara, 541 U.S. at 213 (Kennedy, J., concurring); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN 
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MAsKING OF JUSTICE 21 
(1997); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAw 112 (1987) 
("Our jurisprudence, then, has recognized tribal authority as being both precon-
stitutional and extraconstitutional."); Frickey, supra note 30, at 1156 ("[T]ribal 
sovereignty is inherent and 'pre-constitutional' .... "); cf. Frickey, (Native) Ameri-
can Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 464--65 ("In the last three decades, the 
Court has also been exercising an extraconstitutional power over Indian 
affairs . . . ."). 
64. See United States v. Gregg, No. CR 04-30068, 2005 WL 1806345, at *1 (D.S.D. 
July 27, 2005) ("Indian tribes, unlike the original states, had no connection with 
and no involvement in the drafting and the adoption of the United States Consti-
tution. They had no connection with the give and take which resulted in the 
adoption of the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights."); Clinton, 
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this problem was to label Indian tribes "domestic dependent nations" 
as a matter of federal common law.65 It appears that to the Court, the 
constitutional rights, powers, duties, and responsibilities of Indian 
tribes in "Our Federalism"66 are questions that the Court began to 
wrestle with in 1810.67 If nothing in the Constitution says otherwise, 
then perhaps for the Court, federal Indian law is a problem for the 
Judiciary. This leads to what Professor Frickey calls a "ruthless prag-
matism inconsistent with even the modest respect for tribal preroga-
tives that traditional federal Indian law sometimes reflected in 
appreciation of our colonial past."68 
A. Sources of Federal Indian Policy 
The utterly inconsistent and fluctuating history of federal tribal 
legal affairs is well documented.69 Federal policy toward Indian tribes 
has moved in various decades from physical extirpation70 to measured 
There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 160; Richard A. Mo-
nette, A New Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United 
States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 617, 646-48 (1994); Prakash, supra note 9, at 1107; Charles F. Wil-
kinson, Civil Liberties Guarantees When Indian Tribes Act as Majority Societies: 
The Case of the Winnebago Retrocession, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 773, 774-75 
(1998); cf. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) ("[T]he powers of local self 
government enjoyed by the Cherokee nation existed prior to the Constitu-
tion .... "); see generally Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce 
Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055 (1995) [hereinafter Clinton, The Dormant Indian 
Commerce Clause!' 
65. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). Cf generally Babcock, supra 
note 36; Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of 
the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109 (2004). 
66. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971); Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 428 
(1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
67. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 121, 142-43 (1810); id. at 145-47 (Johnson, J., 
concurring). 
68. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 436. See also id. at 
460 ("The Court has become colonialism's handyman, jerry-rigging a ruthlessly 
pragmatic blend of federal Indian law with general American law."). 
69. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, AMERICAN INDIAN LAw IN A NUTSHELL 11-33 (4th ed. 
2004); CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 18-49; FELIX S. COHEN, 
COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW: 2005 EDITION §§ 1.02-.07 (Nell Jes-
sup Newton et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK 2005 ED.]; Vine 
Deloria, Jr., "Congress in its Wisdom": The Course of Indian Legislation, in THE 
AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 9, at 105; Laurence M. Hauptman, The 
Indian Reorganization Act, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 9, at 
131; Wilcomb E. Washburn, Indian Policy Since the 1880s, in THE AGGRESSIONS 
OF CIVILIZATION, supra note 9, at 45. 
70. See G. William Rice, Of Cold Steel and Blueprints: Musings of an Old Country 
Lawyer on Crime, Jurisprudence, and the Tribal Attorney's Role in Developing 
Tribal Sovereignty, RAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'y, Winter 1997, at 31, 44 (quoting MR. 
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
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separatism71 to remova172 to assimilation73 to self-determination74-
sometimes at the same time.75 
UNITED STATES 13-14 (1840»; cf Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 550 (1832) 
(quoting Treaty of Fort Pitt art. VI, U.S.-Del. Indians, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13). 
71. See WILKINSON, supra note 63, at 14-19; Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, 
Indian Takings, and the Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 458-64 (1998); Frank Pommersheim, Liberation, 
Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L. 
REV. 411, 415; see also 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2000); WILKINSON, supra note 63, at 164 
n.34 (discussing Trade and Intercourse Acts). 
72_ See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 125 S. Ct. 1478, 1485 (2005); 
United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004); Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191-92 (1999); United States v. John, 437 U.S. 
634, 639 n.6 (1978); Cross, supra note 71, at 441-42; Donald E. Laverdure, A 
Historical Braid of Inequality: An Indigenous Perspective of Brown v. Board of 
Education, 43 WASHBURN L.J. 285, 302-03 (2004); Richard White, How Andrew 
Jackson Saved the Cherokees, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 443, 443 (2002) (reviewing ROBERT 
V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND HIS INDIAN WARS (2001)). 
73. See Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 524 U.S. 103, 106-07 
(1998); South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 339-40 (1998); Ha-
gen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 424-25 & nA (1994); County of Yakima v. Confed. 
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 253-54 (1992); Cot-
ton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 199-200 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reserv'n v. Wold Eng'g, 
476 U.S. 877, 892 (1986); John, 437 U.S. at 653 n.24; Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 
U.S. 373, 388--89 (1976); N. Cheyenne Tribe v_ Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 650 
n.1 (1976); Organized Vill. ofKake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 74 (1962); Bd. of County 
Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705, 716 (1943); Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tri-
bal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition 
Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 269 (1997); 
Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7-9 (1995); Re-
becca Tsosie, The Challenge of "Differentiated Citizenship": Can State Constitu-
tions Protect Tribal Rights?, 64 MONT. L. REV. 199, 204-05 (2003); Richard A. 
Monette, Comment, Indian Country Jurisdiction and the Assimilative Crimes 
Act, 69 OR_ L_ REV. 269, 281, 293-94 (1990). 
74. See Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 125 S. Ct. 1172, 1176 (2005); County of 
Yakima, 502 U.S. at 274 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U_S. 202, 216 & n.19 
(1987) (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-35 & 
n.17 (1983)); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 & n.5 (1987); Nat'l 
Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985); 
Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of N.M., 458 U.S. 832, 840 
(1982); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 & n_10 (1980) 
(citing Michael Gross, Indian Self-Determination and Tribal Sovereignty: An 
Analysis of Recent Federal Policy, 56 TEX. L_ REV. 1195 (1978)); Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 & n.11 (1978); Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich 
Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893, 920-23 (2000); Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmen-
tal Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and 
Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 230-32 (1996); see gener-
ally Cross, supra note 9; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State 
Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and 
the Process of Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105. 
75. See generally Duro v. Reina, 495 U_S. 676, 709 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("This country has pursued contradictory policies with respect to the Indians."). 
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As a matter of federal constitutional law, the Indian Commerce 
Clause grants Congress the only explicit constitutional authority to 
deal with Indian tribes.76 Congress has legislated on the subject of 
Indian affairs from the very beginning, starting with the Trade and 
Intercourse Acts.77 It is Congress that decides the overall federal pol-
icy of the United States-and as the popularly elected legislative body, 
that is the way it should be. 
The President and the Executive Branch also retain some poli-
cymaking duties regarding Indian affairs. Until 1871, the President 
retained authority to enter into treaties with Indian tribes.78 With 
that authority, the President helped to drive federal Indian policy for 
decades.79 Congress's termination of the President's authority to 
make treaties with Indian tribes eviscerated much of the President's 
constitutional power to make affirmative federal Indian policy. Con-
gress, however, has delegated much of its authority to make federal 
Indian policy to the Executive,80 namely through the Bureau ofIndian 
Affairs (BIA)81 and other federal agencies, including the Indian 
Health Service82 and the National Indian Gaming Commission.83 
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Lara, 541 U.S. at 200; Prakash, supra note 9, at 
1087-90. 
77. See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 69-70 (1941) [hereinaf-
ter COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED.) (discussing first Trade and Intercourse Acts (cit-
ing Act of July 22,1790, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, 1 Stat. 329; Act of 
May 19, 1796, 1 Stat. 469». 
78. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 201; COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED., supra note 77, at 77 (cit-
ing Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified as amended at 
25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988))); Wilkins, supra note 27, at 12. 
79. See Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility Toward 
the Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton 
Administration's Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 738 (1995) ("At 
the time of the Revolutionary War, the native nations and the United States es-
tablished mutual relations on a government-to-government level through trea-
ties. Because the Constitution places treaty-making power in the President, the 
executive branch dominated Indian affairs." (footnote omitted»; see generally An-
drea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Funda-
mental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TuLSA L. REV. 661, 684-85 
(2002). 
80. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (2000). 
81. See id. § 2 (Commissioner ofIndian Affairs); see generally Morton v. Mancari, 417 
U.S. 535 (1974); Robert J. McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Fed-
eral Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. PuB. L. 1 (2004). 
82. See Indian Health Care Improvement Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-16800 (2000); see 
generally Rose L. Pfefferbaum et aI., Providing for the Health Care Needs of Na-
tive Americans: Policy, Programs, Procedures, and Practices, 21 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 211 (1997). 
83. See 25 U.S.C. § 2704 (2000); LIGHT & RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL SOVER. 
EIGNTY, supra note 2; Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, supra 
note 2, at 431-33; Brian P. McClatchey, Note, A Whole New Game: Recognizing 
the Changing Complexion of Indian Gaming by Removing the "Governor's Veto" 
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Through the promulgation of federal regulations84 and the making of 
informal policy,85 these federal agencies have extensive federal Indian 
policymaking capabilities. 
The third branch-the Federal Judiciary-has wavered through-
out the history of the Federal Constitution, uncertain of its place in 
federal Indian policy. From the time of the Marshall Court to the mid-
1880s, the Supreme Court maintained a federal common law that em-
phasized a wide divide between federal law and policy, and the inter-
nal sovereign affairs of Indian tribes. In Worcester u. Georgia,86 the 
Court drew a bright line separating state law from Indian Country, 
allowing tribes to govern themselves without interference.87 In two 
critical state taxation cases, In re Kansas Indians88 and In re New 
York Indians,89 the Court held that states have no power to tax Indian 
trust lands.90 In Elk u. Wilkins,91 the Court held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not apply to Indians, relying on the fact that, while 
tribes were not foreign nations, they were not entirely included in the 
American constitutional scheme.92 The Court held in Ex parte Crow 
for Gaming on "After-Acquired" Lands, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1227, 1247 
(2004). 
84. E.g., National Indian Gaming Commission Regulations, 25 C.F.R. pt. 501 (2005); 
Contracts Under the Indian Education and Self-Determination Act, 25 C.F.R. pt. 
900 (2005). 
85. See, e.g., Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice's Conflict 
of Interest in Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REV. 1307, 1339-40 
(2003) (discussing the Department of Justice's informal position on representing 
Indian tribes in land-claims cases); Letter from James Cason, Assistant Deputy 
Sec'y, Dep't of the Interior, to Theodore R. Kulongoski, Governor, State of Or. 
(May 20, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.schlosserlawfiles. 
com/Warm%20Springs%20Ltr.pdf (disapproving gaming compact between the 
State of Oregon and the Confederated Tribes ofthe Warm Springs Reservation of 
Oregon); Letter from Gale A. Norton, Sec'y, Dep't of the Interior, to Honorable 
Cyrus Schindler, Nation President, Seneca Nation ofIndians (Nov. 12,2002) (ap-
proving gaming compact allowing off-reservation gaming "reluctantly" and with 
"extreme[ ] concern[ ]"), quoted in Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sawnawgezewog: "The 
Indian Problem" and the Lost Art of Survival, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 35, 86 n.259 
(2003). 
86. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
87. See id. at 520 ("The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its 
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia 
can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but 
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and 
with the acts of [C]ongress."); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: 
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 
HARv. L. REV. 381, 393-406 (1993) (discussing Worcester). 
88. 72 U.S. 737 (1866). 
89. 72 U.S. 761 (1866). 
90. Id. at 771-72; In re Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. at 759-60 (declining taxation of the 
Shawnee, Wea, and Miami lands). 
91. 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 
92. See id. at 99. 
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Dog93 that the federal government had no authority to prosecute Indi-
ans who murder other Indians on reservation lands when the accused 
had already been prosecuted in accordance with tribal law. While the 
Court of the nineteenth century acknowledged, as a matter of federal 
common law, that Indian tribes lost their external sovereignty by the 
mere presence of the United States,94 the Court did not see a constitu-
tional basis for the intervention of American policy or American law 
into the separate and internal affairs of Indian tribes.95 
From the mid-1880s, however, until the latter half of the Burger 
Court years, as Congress and the Executive intervened more into the 
internal affairs of Indian tribes-breaking down the wall that sepa-
rated the federal government from the inner workings of tribal gov-
ernment and society-the Court completely stepped out of the picture. 
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,96 the Court recognized as a matter of fed-
eral common law that Congress possessed unprecedented plenary and 
exclusive power over Indian affairs,97 while at the same time adopting 
the position that congressional decisions on Indian affairs were non-
justiciable political questions.98 The Court adopted a stance for al-
93. 109 U.S. 556,572 (1883) (citing United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617 (1876)). 
Although Elk came after Crow Dog, it was the Court's decision in Crow Dog that 
federal Indian agents used to drum up a political frenzy resulting in the imposi-
tion of federal criminal law into Indian Country through the Major Crimes Act of 
1885,23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000)). See CLINTON, 
GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 101-02; see generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, 
CROW DoG's CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAw, AND UNITED 
STATES LAw IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (Frederick Hoxie & Neal Salisbury 
eds., 1994). 
94. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 
543 (1823); see also Brendale v. Confed. Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 
492 U.S. 408, 453 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (expressing 
the view that splitting tribal zoning authority is inconsistent with the Court's 
past decisions of inherent sovereignty). 
95. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886) (noting that the In-
dian Commerce Clause does not explicitly confer upon Congress the authority to 
enact criminal laws in Indian Country). But see id. at 383-84 (finding congres-
sional authority in the "state of pupilage" in which the Court found Indians re-
sided); id. at 384-85 ("It must exist in that government, because it never has 
existed anywhere else; because the theater of its exercise is within the geographi-
cal limits of the United States; because it has never been denied; and because it 
alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes."). 
96. 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
97. See id. at 565 (noting that Congress has "[p]lenary authority over the tribal rela-
tions of the Indians"). 
98. See id. at 568 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902)). Lone 
Wolf tested the authority of Congress to abrogate an Indian treaty. See id. at 566. 
In twisted irony, the Court asserted two restrictions on congressional plenary 
power, but refused to enforce either. First, Congress should only act in a "contin-
gency" or an emergency related to Indian lands. See id. Second, Congress's 
power depends on its ability to act "in perfect good faith." [d. The plaintiffs in 
Lone Wolf had asserted that federal agents had committed fraud and that no 
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most a century that federal Indian policy choices were political 
questions with which it would not interfere.99 
Until recently, the states have had a very limited role in the mak-
ing offederal Indian policy. The Court retained its stance in Worcester 
through Justice Black's opinion in Williams v. Lee , 100 which denied 
state court jurisdiction over a civil claim brought against an Indian 
over events occurring in Indian Country.101 Yet, as we shall see, from 
the appointment of then-Justice Rehnquist to the present day, the 
Court more frequently and powerfully invoked the interests of state 
governments and non-Indian citizens in its Indian cases.102 
B. Modern Congressional Statements of Federal Indian 
Policy 
Most watchers of Indian affairs agree that federal Indian policy is 
now within the era of self-determination for Indian tribes, an era that 
began in the 1960s and early 1970s.103 Congress has legislated in nu-
merous areas relating to Indian affairs since the mid-1970s, often 
stating a federal policy promoting the self-determination of Indian 
tribes. Congressional and Executive Branch commitment to the fed-
eral policy of tribal self-determination has, for some commentators, 
strengthened or wavered, prompting commentators to suggest that we 
have entered new eras of federal Indian policy-government-to-gov-
particular emergency existed, see id. at 556, 558, 561, strong evidence that Con-
gress, and the federal government overall, had not acted in good faith in the mat-
ter. Despite this, the Court concluded that a lack of good faith was irrelevant 
because it would treat allegations of fraud as nonjusticiable political questions. 
See id. at 568 ("In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the 
judiciary cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enact-
ment of this legislation. If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be 
understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of its power, relief must be 
sought by an appeal to that body for redress, and not to the courts. "). One federal 
judge called Lone Wolf"the Indians' Dred Scott decision." Sioux Nation v. United 
States, 601 F.2d 1157, 1173 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (Nichols, J., concurring), affd, 448 U.S. 
371 (1980). 
99. See supra Part II. 
100. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
101. See id. at 220-21, 223. 
102. See generally Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 27; Skibine, supra note 36. 
103. See CLINTON, GoLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 41 ("President Kennedy prom-
ised the Indians that '[tlhere would be no change in treaty or contractual rela-
tionships without the consent ofthe tribes concerned ... .' "); D'ARCY McNICKLE, 
NATIVE AMERICAN TRIBALISM: INDIAN SURVIVALS AND RENEWALS 124 (rev. ed. 
1973) ("We must affirm their rights to freedom of choice and self-determination." 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lyndon B. Johnson, President, U.S., 
Message to Congress (Mar. 6, 1968»); see generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., 
supra note 69, § 1.07; WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 189,257. 
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ernment relations104 or self-reliance. 105 Regardless, the explicit legis-
lative policy remains self-determination. 
1. Self Governance 
The various self-determination acts include the Indian Self-Deter-
mination and Education Assistance Acp06 and the Native American 
Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act.107 These Acts imple-
ment a federal tribal relationship first proposed by Interior Secretary 
Collier during the debates leading up to the Indian Reorganization Act 
of 1934.108 Up to this time, the federal government relied exclusively 
on the BIA to superintend Indian reservations.109 The federal govern-
ment funded the agency, and the agency ran the reservations. In 
some instances, local BIA superintendents were tyrannical in the 
ways they governed Indian reservations.110 
By the Depression, the long-standing federal Indian policy was 
that Indians and Indian tribes were in a state of pupilage. 111 The fed-
eral government treated tribes as if they needed training in American 
104. CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 45-48. 
105. See Colman McCarthy, Congress Kicking Indians While They're Down, GRAND 
RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), Sept. 22, 1995 ("Another argument heard in the House and 
Senate to justify the budgetary hacking is that Indians, along with others on wel-
fare, need to acquire self-reliance. It's forgotten that social programs for Indians 
are matters of justice, not charity, largesse or the dole."), quoted in Fletcher, 
supra note 85, at 43 n.40. 
106. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458bbb-2 
(2000)). 
107. Pub. L. No. 104-330, 110 Stat. 4017 (1996) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4243 
(2000)). 
108. See H.R. 7902, 73d Cong., tit. I, § 4(i) (2d Sess. 1934) (authorizing Indian tribes 
"[t]o exercise any other powers now or hereafter delegated to the Office of Indian 
Affairs, or any officials thereof, ... and to act in general as an Federal agency in 
the administration of Indian Affairs"), reprinted in VINE DELORIA, JR., THE IN-
DIAN REORGANIZATION ACT: CONGRESSES AND BILLS 10 (2002). 
109. See generally COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED., supra note 77, at 9-32; James E. Of-
ficer, The Indian Service and Its Evolution, in THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION, 
supra note 9, at 59-71. 
110. See, e.g., Allison M. Dussias, Waging War With Words: Native Americans' Contin-
uing Struggle Against the Suppression of Their Languages, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 
905-28 (1999) (identifYing boarding school and language abuses); Allison M. Dus-
sias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christiani-
zation Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN 
L. REV. 773, 776-805 (1997) (identifying religious abuses); cf generally Felix S. 
Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 
62 YALE L.J. 348, 348, 374-86 (1953) (alleging abuses by the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs in the early 1950s). 
111. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 305 (1902); Elk v. Wilkins, 112 
U.S. 94, 106-07 (1884); United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 415-16 (1866); 
Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. 366, 371 (1856); Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 
393,404 (1856); COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED., supra note 77, at 40-43 (discussing 
the "dependence" of Indian tribes on the United States). 
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ways to become civilized. The reservation, as one federal district court 
judge stated in United States u. Clapox,112 was a sort of school, and 
BIA superintendents were school masters.113 Secretary Collier, work-
ing with his brilliant legal counsel, Interior Solicitor Nathan Margold 
and Assistant Interior Solicitor Felix Cohen, proposed abandoning the 
BIA and allowing the tribes to govern their own reservations with fed-
eral assistance.114 BIA employees, desperate to save their floundering 
bureaucracy, did what they could to undermine the proposal, arguing 
at times that tribal governments had no capacity to take over federal 
governmental functions.115 The proposal was dropped in the final ver-
sion of the IRA, replaced with the compromise provision offering pref-
erence to Indians in BIA employment.116 
In the mid-1970s, however, with local control of government a hot 
topic in federal circles, it was the perfect time to begin the process of 
allowing Indian tribes to take over for the BIA. Congress ordered the 
BIA and the Indian Health Service to enter into contracts, known as 
"638-contracts" (named after the Public Law creating the mechanism), 
whereby the tribes would take over certain federal programs at the 
tribe's request.117 For example, a tribe could make a request to the 
BIA to enter into 638-contracts relating to the tribal courts, enroll-
ment, and child welfare functions.l 18 The BIA would have no choice 
but to negotiate a form contract119 with the tribe and turn over a cer-
tain sum of federal dollars that would have been allocated to the BIA 
to operate those functions, minus administrative costs, of course. A 
few years later, Congress began to authorize Indian tribes to take over 
the entire bevy of federal programs administered by the BIA.120 
These tribes are known as self-governance tribes.121 
112. 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888). 
113. See id. at 579 ("[Tlhe act with which these defendants are charged [helping a 
prisoner convicted of adultery escapel is in flagrant opposition to the authority of 
the United States on this reservation, and directly subversive of this laudable 
effort to accustom and educate these Indians in the habit and knowledge of self-
government. It is therefore appropriate and needful that the power and name of 
the government of the United States should be invoked to restrain and punish 
them."). 
114. See supra note 108; Hauptman, supra note 69, at 135-36 (noting the role of Col-
lier, Margold, and Cohen). 
115. See generally Officer, supra note 109, at 72-73. 
116. See Hauptman, supra note 69, at 137. 
117. See 25 U.S.C. § 450f{a) (2000). 
118. See id. 
119. See id. § 450l (2000). 
120. See Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-472, 102 Stat. 2285 (1988) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 25 U.S.C.); see generally Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, 
Self-Governance for Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. 
L. REV. 1251 (1995). 
121. See generally McCarthy, supra note 81, at 135-37. 
HeinOnline -- 85 Neb. L. Rev. 143 2006-2007
2006] FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY 143 
The import of these programs is that Congress has placed its sup-
port behind Indian tribal governments. Although the process of tak-
ing over federal functions by tribes has often been painful and 
annoying,122 congressional support of tribal self-governance is unwa-
vering. The clear federal policy in this area is to advance tribal self-
government. Congress's explicit declaration of policy incorporated into 
the Self-Determination Act is as follows: 
(b) Declaration of commitment 
The Congress declares its commitment to ... the establishment of a mean· 
ingful Indian self·determination policy which will permit an orderly transition 
from the Federal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians . ... In 
accordance with this policy, the United States is committed to supporting and 
assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal govern· 
ments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the econo· 
mies of their respective communities.123 
Similarly, Congress's statement of policy in the Native American 
Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act provided: 
The Congress finds that-
(6) the need for affordable homes in safe and healthy environments on In-
dian reservations, in Indian communities, and in Native Alaskan villages is 
acute and the Federal Government should work not only to provide housing 
assistance, but also, to the extent practicable, to assist in the development of 
private housing finance mechanisms on Indian lands to achieve the goals of 
economic self-sufficiency and self-determination for tribes and their members; 
and 
(7) Federal assistance to meet these responsibilities should be provided in 
a manner that recognizes the right of Indian self-determination and tribal self-
governance by making such assistance available directly to the Indian tribes 
or tribally designated entities under authorities similar to those accorded In-
dian tribes in Public Law 93-638 (25 U.S.C. 450 et seq.).124 
The self-determination acts fulfill much ofthe promise of the origi-
nal version of the Indian Reorganization Act that Commissioner Col-
lier proposed in the early 1930s and affirms the federal Indian policy 
of self-determination and self-governance, an original purpose of the 
IRA itself.125 
122. See Hauptman, supra note 69, at 143; Porter, supra note 9, at 965. 
123. 25 U.S.C. § 450a (2000) (emphasis added). 
124. Id. § 4101 (emphasis added). 
125. See Blackfeet Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 729 F.2d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 1984) 
("Among the purposes ofthe IRA were the promotion ofa significant increase in 
tribal autonomy and authority and the extension to the tribes of 'an opportunity 
to take over the control of their own resources.'" (quoting 78 CONGo REc. 11123, 
11123-25 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wheeler), citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 
535,542 (1974); FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 147 (Ren-
nard Strickland et al. eds., 1982))), affd, 471 U.S. 759 (1985); Cheyenne River 
Sioux Tribe v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D.S.D. 1977) ("The specific purpose 
of the Indian Reorganization Act was to foster and encourage self-government by 
the various Indian tribes." (citing Fisher v. Dist. Ct., 424 U.S. 382 (1976); Mes-
calero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 (1973))); see generally Timothy W. 
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2. Economic Development, Tax Authority, and Immunities 
Congressional policy is also strongly in favor of tribal economic de-
velopment. Congress is fully aware that few Indian tribes have a suf-
ficient tax revenue base to fund a necessary array of governmental 
functions. 126 In the enactment of the IRA, Congress and the Presi-
dent stated that one of the key purposes of that act was to encourage 
tribal economic development,127 An Indian tribe with business opera-
tions sufficient to pay for its own administration, social services, edu-
cation, health care, housing, etc., reduces tribal member dependence 
on the federal, state, and local safety net. Section 17 of the IRA al-
lowed Indian tribes to form economic development corporations under 
federallaw. 128 
Congress took a sharp turn away from tribal self-government and 
economic self-sufficiency during the "Termination Era" of the 1950s 
and 1960s,129 Congress enacted laws terminating the federal supervi-
sion of hundreds of tribes and issued policy statements encouraging 
Joranko & Mark C. Van Norman, Indian Self-Determination at Bay: Secretarial 
Authority to Disapprove Trial Constitutional Amendments, 29 GoNZ. L. REV. 81 
(1993); Porter, supra note 73. 
126. See S. REP. No. 105-95, at 18 (1997) ("This program will help local jurisdictions 
maintain public roads that serve Indian reservations and are used by school 
buses to transport children to or from school or a Headstart program. Such juris-
dictions, which comprise mostly Federal or tribal land, and may not do not [sic] 
have sufficient tax bases to support the maintenance of roads on these Federal 
lands."); S. REP. No. 102-158, at 5 (1991) ("Despite the progress made in recent 
years among Indian tribes and individuals, most American Indians and other N a-
tive Americans continue to experience rates of joblessness far higher than other 
Americans, owing, among other things, to an absence of employment opportuni-
ties. In locations often remote from population centers and usually lacking a tax 
base, most tribal governments are handicapped in their efforts to stimulate local 
economic development and, in some locations, to effectively carry out the basic 
functions of government."); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Eco-
nomic Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 
759, 771-72 (2004). 
127. See 25 U.S.C. § 470 (2000) (establishing revolving fund for economic development 
loans to tribal corporations); id. § 477 (establishing authority for tribes to estab-
lish economic development corporations); Laurie Reynolds, Indian Hunting and 
Fishing Rights: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption, 62 N.C. L. REV. 
743, 785-86 (1984) (citing S. REP. No. 73-1080, at 3-4 (1934»; Comment, Tribal 
Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 
955, 961 (1972) (citing H.R. 7902, 73d Congo (2d Sess. 1934); S. 2755, 73d Congo 
(2d Sess. 1934»; cf South Dakota V. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 935, 
942 (D.S.D. 2004) (agreeing that federal agency could take land into trust under 
IRA provisions where action would improve tribal economic development oppor-
tunities), affd, 423 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 
3020 (U.S. May 8,2006) (No. 05-1428). 
128. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000). 
129. See Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Pol-
icy, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 139, 140 (1977). 
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the BIA to wind down tribal operations on all reservations.130 Con-
gress then turned away from that mode and returned to the self-suffi-
ciency and economic development mode of the IRA. 
Congress enacted numerous pieces of legislation since the 1970s to 
encourage tribal economic development and ease tax burdens on In-
dian tribes.131 In each piece of legislation, Congress made findings of 
fact and strong statements of support for tribal economic develop-
ment. For Congress, the long-term solution to tribal dependence on 
federal programs lies in reservations with economic strength.132 Con-
gress's recent commitment to encouraging tribal economic develop-
ment has been unwavering. 
Congress's first piece of legislation designed to bolster tribal eco-
nomic development in the self-determination era was the Indian Fi-
nancing Act of 1974.133 Section 1 of the Act provides: 
It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to provide capital on a 
reimbursable basis to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical 
and human, to a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for 
the utilization and management of their own resources and where they will 
enjoy a standard ofliving from their own productive efforts comparable to that 
enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities.134 
The House Report accompanying the Act made clear that Congress's 
intent was to promote tribal economies through the development of 
individual and tribal capital structures.135 The House Report elabo-
rated by noting, "On every reservation today, there is almost a total 
lack of an economic community. If the long-sought goal of Indian self-
sufficiency is to be reached, such financial assistance must be pro-
130. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 71-81, 178-82 (identifying laws terminating fed-
eral provisions of the Menominee, Klamath, California, Oregon, and Colville 
tribes); Cross, supra note 74, at 963--64 (discussing proposed termination of Fort 
Berthold Reservation). 
The termination policy was misguided and utterly disastrous for Indians and 
Indian tribes. See WINONA LADUKE, RECOVERING THE SACRED: THE POWER OF 
NAMING AND CLAIMING 52-55 (2005) (describing impacts at Klamath); WILKINSON, 
supra note 4, at 81-84 (documenting impacts at Klamath and Menominee); Wil-
kinson & Biggs, supra note 129, at 144. 
131. See infra text accompanying notes 132-41. 
132. See Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 152 (1973) ("The intent and 
purpose of the Reorganization Act was 'to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life 
and to give him a chance to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of op-
pression and paternalism.'" (quoting H.R. REP. No. 73-1804, at 6 (1934), citing S. 
REP. No. 73-1080, at 1 (1934))); Seth H. Row, Student Research, Tribal Sover-
eignty and Economic Development on the Reservation, 4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING Pov-
ERTY 227, 227 (1996). 
133. See Pub. L. No. 93-262, 88 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1544 (2000». 
134. 25 U.S.C. § 1451 (2000). 
135. See H.R. REP. No_ 93-907, at 1 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2873, 
2874 ("The purpose of the bill . __ is to provide Indian tribes and individuals 
[with) capital in the form of loans and grants to promote economic and other 
development. "). 
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vided or facilitated."136 In short, tribal economic development, accord-
ing to Congress, is critical to tribal self-sufficiency. 
In 1982, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Government Tax Sta-
tus Act,137 further cementing its support for tribal economic develop-
ment efforts.l38 In this Act, Congress extended many (but not all) of 
the tax advantages enjoyed by state and local governments to Indian 
tribal governments.139 Congress intended the Act to "create the de-
velopment environment necessary for true economic and social self-
sufficiency."14o 
In perhaps the strongest and most explicit statement in favor of 
tribal economic development, Congress codified and validated Indian 
gaming operations in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (lGRA).141 
Congress made an explicit statement of federal Indian policy strongly 
136. Id. at 6-7, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2874. 
137. See Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2607 (codified in part at 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2000». 
138. See generally Robert A. Williams, Jr., Small Steps on the Long Road to Self-Suffi-
ciency for Indian Nations: The Indian Tribal Governmental Tax Status Act of 
1982, 22 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 335 (1985). 
139. See 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (2000). 
140. See Williams, supra note 138, at 357 (citing 127 CONGo REC. 11132 (1982) (state-
ment of Sen. Wallop». 
141. See Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 
(2000»; see also Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. 
United States, 367 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Congress passed IGRA for the 
purpose of creating a federal regulatory scheme for the operation of gaming on 
Indian lands." (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000». 
As many courts and commentators have correctly noted, Congress enacted 
IGRA in response to the Supreme Court's decision in California v. Cabazon Band 
of Mission Indians of California, 480 U.S. 202 (1987). See Artichoke Joe's Cal. 
Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712, 715 (9th Cir. 2003); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe 
of Okla. v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 327 F.3d 1019, 1022-23 (10th Cir. 
2003); Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 36 F.3d 1325, 1330 (5th Cir. 1994); Taxpay-
ers of Mich. Against Casinos v. State, 685 N.W.2d 221, 237 (Mich. 2004); Dalton 
v. Pataki, 835 N.E.2d 1180, 1188 (N.Y. 2005); McClatchey, supra note 83, at 
1242; Rand & Light, supra note 24, at 382; Alex Tallchief Skibine, Gaming on 
Indian Reservations: Defining the Trustee's Duty in the Wake of Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 129 (1997); Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic 
Survival: The Consent Principle and Tribal-State Compacts Under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARIz. ST. L.J. 25, 49 (1997). 
Some courts and commentators have asserted that a critical element of con-
gressional intent in passing IGRA was to slow or halt the spread (or proliferation) 
of Indian gaming. See Ponca Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 37 F.3d 1422, 1425 
(10th Cir. 1994), vacated, 517 U.S. 1129 (1996); Texas v. Ysleta del sur Pueblo, 
220 F. Supp. 2d 668, 681 n.6 (W.D. Tex. 2001); Nicholas S. Goldin, Note, Casting 
a New Light on Tribal Casino Gaming: Why Congress Should Curtail the Scope of 
High Stakes Indian Gaming, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 798, 824 n.200 (1999). How-
ever, this view is the minority view and has not been upheld by a court of last 
resort. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. U.S. 
Att'y for the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 933 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (re-
jecting State of Michigan's argument that the purpose of IGRA was to "limit the 
proliferation of casinos"), affd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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favoring tribal economic development by stating that IGRA is in-
tended "to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by 
Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, 
self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."142 
In short, explicit congressional statements of federal Indian policy, 
as well as legislative history related to Indian affairs legislation, 
strongly support the tribal economic development activities of Indian 
tribes. This is critical given that the only textual support within the 
Constitution for congressional authority is the Indian Commerce 
Clause. 143 
3. Tribal Court Development 
Part and parcel of tribal governance is tribal court development, 
but the history of tribal court development is spotty. The first tribal 
courts for many reservations were the old Courts of Indian Of-
fenses,144 later known as CFR Courts.145 These courts are Article II 
courts created by the Secretary of the Interior and run by the BIA to 
regulate the reservation activities ofIndians.146 The BIA enacted res-
ervation law-and-order codes as federal regulations for every activity 
of reservation life from crimes to curfews to religious ceremonies.147 
142. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1} (2000) (emphasis added). See Grand Traverse Band of Ot-
tawa & Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Att'y for the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 
971 (6th Cir. 2004); City of Roseville v. Norton, 348 F.3d 1020, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 
2003); Seneca-Cayuga Tribe, 327 F.3d at 1033; Am. Greyhound Racing, Inc. v. 
Hull, 305 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002); Diamond Game Enters., Inc. v. Reno, 
230 F.3d 365, 367-68 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
143. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: 
Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 205 (2000) (describing the Indian Commerce Clause as 
"grant of singular authority to Congress to regulate intercourse and trade with 
Indian tribes, the only minority group explicitly mentioned in the Constitution"). 
144_ See Watt v. Colville Confed. Tribes, 25 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training 
Program) 6027, 6028 (Colville Confed. Tribes Ct. App. 1998) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (describing the history of the Colville tribal courts); Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clif-
ford M. Lytle, Courts of Indian Offenses, in JUSTIN B. RICHLAND & SARAH DEER, 
INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES 76-77 (Jerry Gardner ed., 2004). 
145. See Deloria & Lytle, supra note 144, at 78; Stacy L. Leeds, Cross-Jurisdictional 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: A Tribal Court Perspective, 76 N.D. 
L. REV. 311, 353 n.259 (2000). 
146. See, e.g., Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888); STEVEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIANS AND TRIBES 103 (2002); Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurispru-
dence of Rape, 14 RAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 121, 128 n.75 (2004); Gloria Valencia-
Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 225, 233-35 
(1994). 
147. See Clapox, 35 F. at 578-79; Deloria & Lytle, supra note 144, at 78; Valencia-
Weber, supra note 146, at 235; cf. generally Cohen, supra note 110 (alleging that 
the Bureau ofIndian Affairs exercised complete, authoritarian control over many 
reservations). 
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BIA agents used the courts and the codes to stamp out traditional 
ceremonies. 148 
Through the IRA, Congress made a strong statement in support of 
tribal governments but ignored tribal courts.149 It is possible that 
Congress was implicitly recognizing that Indian tribes, as a general 
rule, did not resolve disputes using an adversarial court system in the 
Anglo-American model.150 BIA officials and superintendents working 
with tribes to develop written constitutions encouraged, and in some 
cases coerced, tribes to adopt a model IRA constitution.151 The model 
IRA constitutions read similar to a municipal code,152 not like a gov-
erning document useful for sovereign governments that pre-existed 
the United States Constitution. The constitutions often did not pro-
vide for the establishment of tribal courts.153 Where they did, they 
did not provide for a separation of powers;154 typically, the constitu-
tion would authorize the tribal council to create the tribal court.155 
Congress unwittingly gave a large boost to tribal courts by enact-
ing the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).156 On one hand, the Act itself 
is certainly a denigration of tribal sovereign authority, limiting the 
powers of tribal governments,157 but the Act does not provide a federal 
148. See Deloria & Lytle, supra note 144, at 78. 
149. See Christine Zuni, Legal History of Tribal Courts, in INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL 
LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 144, at 78, 80-81. 
150. See generally Ada Pecos Melton, Indigenous Justice Systems and Tribal Society, 
in RICHLAND & DEER, supra note 144, at 314--320. 
151. See Thorstenson v. Cudmore, 18 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Pro-
gram) 6051, 6053 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. 1991); RUSSEL BARSH & JAMES 
YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY 
96-111 (1980); Ralph W. Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and 
United States Policy Toward the Indians, 66 WASH. L. REV. 643, 703 (1991); 
Porter, supra note 73, at 269; Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian 
Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 712 (1989); Wil-
liams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law, supra note 56, at 276-77. 
152. See Dalia Tsuk, The New Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 189, 224 (1999). 
153. See, e.g., CONST. AND BY-LAws FOR THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET IN-
DIAN RESERVATION OF MONT., http://thorpe.ou.edulconstitutionlblackfeetlbfcont-
TOC.html (last visited June 21, 2006); CHEYENNE-ARAPAHO TRIBES OF OKLA. 
CONST. AND By-LAws, http://thorpe.ou.edulconstitution/Chyn_aph.html (last vis-
ited June 21, 2006). 
154. See generally Michael D. Petoskey, Tribal Courts, MICH. B.J., May 1988, at 366 
(discussing the separation of powers contained in the Constitution of the Grand 
Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians). 
155. E.g., CONST. AND By LAws OF THE HOOPA VALLEY TRIBE, HOOPA VALLEY INDIAN 
RESERVATION art. IX, § 1(n), http://www.narf.org/nilllConstitutions/hoopaconst/ 
hoopatoc.htm (last visited June 21, 2006). 
156. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. II, 82 Stat. 73 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 
(2000». 
157. See Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, supra note 56, at 930. 
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court forum in which to vindicate civil rights. 158 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 159 explicitly stated 
that persons alleging ICRA violations must use a tribal forum, usually 
tribal courts.160 This ruling required tribal courts to develop quickly 
and in a manner sophisticated enough to handle complex civil rights 
litigation. 161 
And since the 1990s, Congress has unfailingly made statements of 
federal policy in favor of tribal court development. In 1993, Congress 
enacted the Indian Tribal Justice Act.162 There, Congress stated: 
The Congress finds and declares that-
(5) tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve 
as important forums for ensuring public health and safety and the political 
integrity of tribal governments; 
(6) Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal justice 
systems as the appropriate forums for the adjudication of disputes affecting 
personal and property rights; 
(7) traditional tribal justice practices are essential to the maintenance of the 
culture and identity of Indian tribes and to the goals of this chapter; 
(9) tribal government involvement in and commitment to improving tribal jus-
tice systems is essential to the accomplishment of the goals of this chapter.163 
Unfortunately, Congress did not appropriate funds to implement the 
legislation.164 Nevertheless, the statute is an important statement 
about federal Indian policy relating to tribal courts. 
158. See Kevin Gover & Robert Laurence, Avoiding Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: 
The Litigation in Federal Court of Civil Actions Under the Indian Civil Rights 
Act, 8 RAMLINE L. REV. 497, 522 (1985); Kevin J. Worthen, Shedding New Light 
on an Old Debate: A Federal Indian Law Perspective on Congressional Authority 
to Limit Federal Question Jurisdiction, 75 MINN. L. REV. 65, 67 (1990); Alvin J. 
Ziontz, After Martinez: Indian Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1,26 (1979). 
159. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
160. See id. at 66~7. 
161. See INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 144, at 258. 
162. See Pub. L. No. 103-176, 107 Stat. 2004 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601--3631 
(2000». 
163. 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000) (emphasis added). See Kiowa Indian Tribe of Okla. v. 
Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1166 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Headdress, 
953 F. Supp. 1272, 1296 (D. Utah 1996); John v. Baker, 982 P.2d 738, 754 (Alaska 
1999); Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 
665 N.W.2d 899, 917 (Wis. 2003); Kristen A. Carpenter, Interpreting Indian 
Country in State of Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 35 TuLSA L.J. 73, 139 
(1999); Ralph J. Erikstad & James Ganje, Tribal and State Courts-A New Be-
ginning, 71 N.D. L. REV. 569, 573 n.22 (1995); Porter, supra note 73, at 271-72; 
Judith Resnik, Multiple Sovereignties: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal 
Government, 79 JUDICATURE 118, 121 (1995). 
164. CLINTON, GOLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 48. 
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In 2000, Congress enacted the Indian Tribal Justice Technical and 
Legal Assistance Act.165 Congress made more explicit findings and 
statements of federal Indian policy, reaffirming its 1993 statements: 
The Congress finds and declares that-
(2) Indian tribes are sovereign entities and are responsible for exercising gov-
ernmental authority over Indian lands; 
(5) tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve 
as important forums for ensuring the health and safety and the political integ-
rity of tribal governments; 
(6) Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal justice 
systems as the most appropriate forums for the adjudication of disputes af-
fecting personal and property rights on Native lands; 
(7) enhancing tribal court systems and improving access to those systems 
serves the dual Federal goals of tribal political self-determination and eco· 
nomic self-sufficiency . ... 166 
These are strong statements of federal Indian policy in favor of the 
development of tribal court systems, tribal self-government, and, most 
importantly, tribal court jurisdiction over Indian lands.167 
4. Sovereign Immunity 
The judge-made doctrine of sovereign immunity does not necessa-
rily fit well under the category of congressional statements of federal 
policy, but this is one area where the Supreme Court gives grudging 
deference to Congress. In cases such as Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. 
Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,168 and more implicitly, Oklahoma 
Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of 
Oklahoma,169 the Court has upheld the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity from strenuous challenge, but has invited Congress to re-
visit the question. 170 The Court asserted, "In our interdependent and 
mobile society, however, tribal immunity extends beyond what is 
needed to safeguard tribal self-governance. This is evident when 
tribes take part in the Nation's commerce. Tribal enterprises now in-
clude ski resorts, gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians."I71 
The Court cited instances where Congress acted to waive the immu-
165. See Pub. L. No. 106-559, 114 Stat. 2778 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 3651--3681 
(2000)). 
166. 25 U.S.C. § 3651 (2000) (emphasis added). 
167. See generally Kevin K Washburn & Chloe Thompson, A Legacy of Public Law 
280: Comparing and Contrasting Minnesota's New Rule for Recognition of Tribal 
Court Judgments with the Recent Arizona Rule, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 479, 
499-500 (2004). 
168. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
169. 498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
170. See Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760. 
171. [d. at 758 (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Potawat-
omi Tribe, 498 U.S. 505; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)). 
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nity of certain tribes in certain circumstances and where Congress 
could have eliminated the doctrine altogether, concluding that Con-
gress has not yet made a clear statement of intent to eviscerate tribal 
sovereign immunity.172 
And the Court is correct. Congress has often debated the useful-
ness of tribal sovereign immunity, concluding that Indian tribes 
should retain the immunity from suit of a sovereign.173 So, as a mat-
ter of federal Indian policy, there is plenty of explicit and implicit con-
gressional support for the doctrine.174 
c. Modern Presidential Statements of Federal Indian Policy 
During the "treaty era" of federal Indian policy, the Executive pos-
sessed much more explicit authority to make policy in this area.175 
The President and his delegates negotiated treaties between Indian 
tribes and the federal government, resulting in the cession of hun-
dreds of millions of acres of land from the tribes to the federal govern-
ment.176 Moreover, when negotiations failed, it was the President as 
Commander-in-Chief who made war on the tribes.177 Jealous of the 
President and the Senate, the House, in an act of dubious constitu-
tionality, revoked the power of the President to negotiate treaties.178 
Congress, at that time, became the leading branch of government in 
the area of federal Indian policy. 
Nevertheless, the bureaucracy wielded an almost unparalleled and 
absolute power on the ground in Indian Country throughout the latter 
half of the nineteenth century and even into the present day.179 The 
BIA controlled the day-to-day activities of many reservation Indi-
172. See id. at 758-59 (citing 25 U.S.C. §§ 450trc)(3), 450n, 1451, 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) 
(2000)). 
173. See H.R. REP. No. 106-501, at 3-4 (2000); S. REP. No. 106-150, at 11-12 (1999). 
174. See Seielstad, supra note 79, at 751-53; Struve, supra note 56, at 181-82; see 
generally Thomas P. Schlosser, Sovereign Immunity: Should the Sovereign Con-
trol the Purse?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 309 (2000); Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Note, 
Towards Tribal Sovereignty and Judicial Efficiency: Ordering the Defenses of Tri-
bal Sovereign Immunity and Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
569, 573-75 (2002). 
175. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK 2005 ED., supra note 69, § 5.03. 
176. See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror, 
41 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (1992); David Wilkins, Quit-Claiming the Doctrine of Dis-
covery: A Treaty-Based Reappraisal, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 277 (1998). 
177. See, e.g., LADUKE, supra note 130, at 99-103; Carol Chomsky, The United 
States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REV. 13 
(1990). 
178. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004); COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED., 
supra note 77, at 77 (citing Appropriation Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1988))); Wilkins, supra note 27, at 12. 
179. See Cohen, supra note 110, at 352-90; Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford Lytle, The 
Evolution of Tribal Governments, in INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES, 
supra note 144, at 63, 64; Hauptman, supra note 69, at 140-41. 
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ans. 180 The BIA also carefully and quietly wrote off dozens, if not 
hundreds, of Indian tribes by refusing to provide services or superin-
tendence.181 The American Indian Policy Review Commission identi-
fied hundreds of tribes that the BIA had disregarded over the 
decades-all without express congressional approval.182 
However, the IRA's Indian preference provisions, after decades of 
obstinate but unsurprising BIA resistance,183 began to alter the na-
ture of the agency. Few BIA employees were Indians at the time Con-
gress enacted the IRA.184 Now, more than ninety percent of BIA 
employees are Indians, including most employees holding high-level 
policymaking positions.185 As a result, Executive Branch policymak-
ing mirrors congressional federal Indian policy in every important 
way since the 1970s. 
1. Nixon's Self-Determination Address (and Kennedy and 
Johnson) 
Executive Branch policymaking, and possibly even federal poli-
cymaking, begins with the President as chief legislator. The first 
President in the modern era to advocate for tribal reservation develop-
ment was President Kennedy.186 His successor, President Johnson, 
echoed support for tribal government and reservation development.187 
But it was President Nixon who most pointedly issued a statement 
about federal Indian policy in his 1970 address to Congress.188 Presi-
dent Nixon's message was a dramatic reversal and renunciation of the 
Termination Era of federal Indian policy, and as some commentators 
noted, "set the legislative agenda for Congress in the field of Indian 
affairs for the entire decade."189 
180. See generally Cohen, supra note 110. 
181. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Att'y for 
the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960, 961~2 (6th Cir. 2004) (discussing improper 
administrative termination of the Grand Traverse Band); id. at 962 (discussing 
improper administrative termination of Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians, 
Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, and Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa 
Indians); see also TASK FORCE TEN, U.S. AM. INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, RE· 
PORT ON TERMINATED AND NONFEDERALLY RECOGNIZED INDIANS (1976). 
182. See TASK FORCE TEN, supra note 181. 
183. See generally Cohen, supra note 110, at 383-84 (discussing firing of the most 
competent Bureau employees during the 1950s); Note, The Indian: The Forgotten 
American, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1818, 1820 (1968). 
184. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 542 (1974). 
185. See GETCHES, WILKINSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 1, at 232. 
186. See CLINTON, GoLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 41; McNICKLE, supra note 
103, at 115-16. 
187. See McNICKLE, supra note 103, at 124. 
188. PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN 
POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363 (1970); 116 CONGo REC. 23258 (1970). 
189. CLINTON, GoLDBERG, & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 43. 
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President Reagan's tenure in office was a mixed bag. Importantly, 
the Reagan Administration supported tribal economic development in 
numerous ways. That administration's impetus for tribal economic 
development was explicitly to "reduce [tribal] dependence on Federal 
funds by providing a greater percentage of the cost of their self-gov-
ernment."190 Though the underlying motivation of the President's 
federal Indian policy was not charitable,191 some results were power-
ful. As had already begun in the 1970s, federal agencies, particularly 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, began to provide 
federal funds and financial assistance for tribes to begin operating 
bingo halls and card rooms.192 The Court noted the importance of this 
federal assistance to tribal gaming establishments in its path-mark-
ing case, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,193 which 
precluded states from regulating Indian bingo halls.194 
2. Government-to-Government Relationship 
The federal agencies, particularly the BIA-but also other federal 
agencies administering federal lands, property, and natural re-
sources-had long treated Indians and Indian tribes poorly. As noted 
above, the BIA has a long history of attempting to forcibly assimilate 
and even Christianize Indians,195 but other federal agencies are guilty 
of this cultural imperialism as well.196 
President Clinton made no new huge federal Indian policy state-
ments but did issue numerous executive orders to the federal agencies 
requiring them to deal with Indian tribes on a government-to-govern-
ment basis and to consult with Indian tribes on any new policy 
changes or rules promulgations.197 Around this time, several federal 
agencies began to engage in a negotiated rulemaking process with In-
dian tribes over the creation of new or amended federal regulations 
dealing with critical federal programs.198 
190. Statement of Indian Policy, 1 PuB. PAPERS 97 (Jan. 24, 1983). 
191. The first Interior Secretary under President Reagan, James Watt, infamously 
criticized Indian tribes as examples of the failures of socialism. See Fletcher, 
supra note 126, at 784-85. 
192. See Michael D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 769, 772 (1995). 
193. 480 U.S. 202, 217-18 (1987). 
194. See id. at 221-22. 
195. See United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888); Cohen, supra note 110, 
at 359. 
196. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, at 1-4 (1978); PEvAR, supra note 146, at 63-64. 
197. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,175,65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000); Exec. Order 
No. 13,084,63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Memorandum on Government-to-
Government Relations With Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 
22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994); see CLINTON, GoLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 47. 
198. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 4116(b)(2)(A) (2000) (requiring negotiated rulemaking for 
rules promulgation under Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Deter-
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As demonstrated in this Part, Congress and the Executive have 
inextricably intertwined many of the interests of the federal govern-
ment with the interests of Indians and Indian tribes. But, as Part III 
establishes, despite the unwavering federal Indian policy expressed by 
the political branches of the federal government in favor of tribal self-
governance, tribal court development, economic development, and 
other important tribal interests, the Supreme Court has frequently ig-
nored those policy statements. 
III. UNGROUNDED FEDERAL JUDGE-MADE INDIAN LAW, OR 
THE SUPREME COURT AS FEDERAL 
INDIAN POLICYMAKER 
Federal common law is judge-made law.199 It is law that the fed-
eral courts propound in areas of federal subject matters where no act 
of Congress controls and no regulation of the Executive Branch ap-
plies. Where Congress hears of a federal court decision relying upon 
federal common law, it has the authority to legislate to codify the deci-
sion, modify or expand the decision, or even reverse the decision.2oo 
But what happens when the Supreme Court makes federal com-
mon law in a particular area of federal subject matter and Congress 
has little or no constitutional authority in that area? Can Congress 
still overrule, modify, or codify the Court's pronouncement? Or does 
the Court retain exclusive power to decide those matters? What is the 
role of the Executive? 
This Part provides an overview of how these questions are an-
swered by the federal government in the area offederal Indian law. In 
short, as some commentators have already alleged, it appears that the 
Supreme Court, at least potentially, could assert virtually unlimited 
authority over these matters-a sort of judicial plenary power to make 
federal policy and to make law.201 Other commentators suggest that 
where federal positive law is silent, state constitutional and statutory 
mination Act); see generally Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
648, 104 Stat. 4970 (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (2000». 
199. See Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 
HARv. L. REV. 881, 890-91 (1986); Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law 
in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 931 (2004); cf Philip P. Frickey, A 
Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: A Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal 
Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1,3 (1999); Laurence, Symmetry and 
Asymmetry, supra note 36, at 906; Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the 
Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in 
Indian Country, 36 TuLsA L.J. 267,293-94 (2000). 
200. See Field, supra note 199, at 896. 
201. See Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 214; Pom-
mersheim, supra note 25, at 328; Prakash, supra note 9, at 1070-71. 
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law fills the gap.202 These commentators suggest further that federal 
common law itself is possibly an impermissible infringement on state 
law.203 
Perhaps the best example of how the Supreme Court has asserted 
this plenary power is the case of County of Yakima v. Confederated 
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation.204 That decision held 
that lands alienated under an allotment statute, but reacquired by the 
tribe or individual Indians, were taxable by the state.205 The Court 
began by noting that the federal Indian policy at the time the lands 
had been alienated was "to extinguish tribal sovereignty, erase reser-
vation boundaries, and force the assimilation of Indians into the soci-
ety at large.''206 The Court then stated that the federal Indian policy 
changed in 1934 with the enactment of the IRA, with Congress 
"[r]eturning to the principles of tribal self-determination and self-gov-
ernance which had characterized the pre-Dawes Act era."207 How-
ever, the Court pointed out that Congress did not enact legislation 
that would have reversed the damage done during the Allotment 
Era.208 The Yakima Nation argued that, while the allotment act 
opened the door to state taxation authority on alienated lands,209 the 
IRA210-and later, the codified Indian Country definitional stat-
ute211-closed that door.212 The Court rejected this argument, rely-
ing on judge-made law in other contexts; namely that implied repeals 
202. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of Federal Common Law, 12 PACE L. 
REV. 303, 305-D6 (1992). 
203. See, e.g., id. 
204. 502 U.S. 251 (1992). 
205. See id. at 270. 
206. Id. at 254 (citing In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 499 (1905)). 
207. Id. at 255. 
208. See id. at 255-56 (citing WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MANs LANDIWHITE MANs 
LAw 145 (1971)). 
209. Section 6 of the General Allotment Act provided that, at the expiration of a period 
of years where lands allotted to Indians would be tax-exempt, state taxes would 
begin to apply. See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2000). 
210. As the Court noted, in enacting the IRA: 
Congress halted further allotments and extended indefinitely the ex-
isting periods of trust applicable to already allotted (but not yet fee-pat-
ented) Indian lands. In addition, the Act provided for restoring 
unallotted surplus Indian lands to tribal ownership, and for acquiring, 
on behalf of the tribes, lands "within or without existing reservations." 
County of Yakima, 502 U.S. at 255 (citations omitted) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 465 
(2000)). 
211. As the Court characterized the Nation's argument, "In 1948, for instance, Con-
gress defined 'Indian country' to include all fee land within the boundaries of an 
existing reservation, whether or not held by an Indian, and pre-empted state 
criminal laws within 'Indian country' insofar as offenses by and against Indians 
were concerned." Id. at 260 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1153 (2000); Seymour v. 
Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351 (1962)). 
212. See id. at 259~0. 
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of federal statutes are not favored,213 and when two or more statutes 
are in apparent conflict but are capable of co-existence, the Court 
must regard both as effective.214 There was no federal statute that 
controlled the outcome of the case, but there was a definitive state-
ment of federal Indian policy from Congress that the ravages of the 
Allotment Era should be stopped, and where possible, reversed. The 
Court disregarded federal Indian policy to reach an opposing out-
come-one directly in favor of state governments and non-Indian 
landowners, the direct beneficiaries of the Allotment Era. 
The Court even rejected (or, as Justice Blackmun stated, "misap-
plie[d]"215) its own precedents. The Court's precedents supported the 
Nation, requiring that Congress must make its intention to open In-
dian lands to state taxation "unmistakably clear."216 Despite a force-
ful statement of federal Indian policy by Congress and strong 
Supreme Court precedent in favor of the tax immunity of Indian 
tribes, the Court authorized state taxation. The Court, in an almost 
arrogant challenge to Indian tribes and Congress, instructed the Na-
tion to seek legislation from Congress to reverse the result;217 al-
though, in fact, Congress had already legislated nearly sixty years 
before to abandon the Allotment Era.218 
The County of Yakima opinion is merely one case that typifies 
Rehnquist Court Indian cases where the Court asserts a plenary poli-
cymaking power. The elements of these cases usually run along these 
lines: (1) the subject matter is outside the scope ofthe limited terms of 
the Indian Commerce Clause; (2) the Court must choose between two 
or more competing interests-typically federal, tribal, state, and indi-
vidual; and (3) no statute controls the outcome. The Court's judge-
made doctrines at issue in these sorts of cases often are the doctrines 
of implicit divestiture of tribal inherent authority, and the plenary 
and exclusive power of Congress to legislate in the area of Indian af-
fairs, as discussed below. 
213. See id. at 262 (quoting Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936». 
214. See id. at 265-66 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). 
215. [d. at 270 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
216. [d. at 258 (majority opinion) (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 
765 (1985), citing California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 
215 n.17 (1987». 
217. See id. at 265. 
218. See 25 U.S.C. § 461 (2000) ("On and after June 18, 1934, no land of any Indian 
reservation, created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians, Act of 
Congress, Executive order, purchase, or otherwise, shall be allotted in severalty 
to any Indian."). 
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A. The Court Doubts the Inherent Sovereign Powers of 
Indian Tribes and Expands the Doctrine of Implicit 
Divestiture 
157 
Felix S. Cohen famously described the formulation that federal 
courts had announced in decades of cases-acquiesced to by Congress 
and the Executive-that Indian tribes retained the inherent powers of 
sovereignty that they possessed since time immemorial except those 
the tribes had agreed to release through treaties and other agree-
ments, or those Congress explicitly divested from the tribes via legis-
lation.219 Cohen's statement was accurate at that time except for one 
glaring omission: The very first Indian case the Court decided in 1823, 
Johnson v. M'Intosh,220 was a case of implicit divestiture. There, the 
Court held that Indian tribes had been divested of the right to alienate 
their land to any person or entity except the conquering sovereign.221 
Cohen's statement was perhaps an accurate statement of normative 
federal Indian law, but Johnson illustrates that the very foundation of 
federal Indian law is based on the notion of implicit divestiture of in-
herent tribal sovereignty.222 Implicit divestiture, a notion that has 
been criticized by commentators,223 is the doctrine whereby an Indian 
tribe might lose an aspect of its inherent sovereign authority without 
either an act of Congress or a treaty expressing that divestiture.224 
219. Cohen's exact statement was this: " [Tlhose powers which are lawfully vested in an 
Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted by express acts of Con-
gress, but rather inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which has never been 
extinguished." COHEN'S HANDBOOK 1ST ED., supra note 77, at 122. 
220. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
221. See id. at 604-05. 
222. See N. Bruce Duthu, Implicit Divestiture of Tribal Powers: Locating Legitimate 
Sources of Authority in Indian Country, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 353, 371 (1994) 
(discussing the result of Johnson as an implicit divestiture of tribal authority). 
223. See Bethany R. Berger, Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers 
in Tribal Legal Systems, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1047 (2005); Bethany R. Berger, "Power 
over this Unfortunate Race": Race, Politics and Indian Law in United States v. 
Rogers, 45 WM. & MARy L. REV. 1957,2046-49 (2004); Duthu, supra note 222, at 
353-402; Frickey, supra note 199, at 43-48; Frickey, supra note 87, at 437-38 
n.243; Frickey, supra note 30, at 1160-64; Getches, Conquering the Cultural 
Frontier, supra note 27, at 1595-617; Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society's 
Judicial Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil Law to Apply to Non-Indians: Reserva-
tion Diminishment, Modern Demography and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 781,800-05 (1996); McSloy, supra note 56, at 278; Laurie Reynolds, 
"Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law: Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme 
Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359, 377-80 (1997); Skibine, supra note 199, at 
270-80; Dean B. Suagee, The Supreme Court's "Whack-A-Mole" Game Theory in 
Federal Indian Law, a Theory that Has No Place in the Realm of Environmental 
Law, GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J., Fall 2002, at 90, 97-124. 
224. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (deciding that Indian tribes do not 
possess civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers except in very narrow 
circumstances); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (same); Duro v. 
Reina, 495 U.S 676 (1990) (deciding that Indian tribes do not possess the author-
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Cohen's statement, however, was influential on federal courts and 
was even quoted, in part, by the Court in United States v. Wheeler,225 
and virtually adopted in toto by Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.226 
In Wheeler, the Court stated, "The sovereignty that the Indian tribes 
retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the suffer-
ance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until 
Congress acts, the tribes retain their existing sovereign powers."227 
The Court in Wheeler, however, had to acknowledge that less than a 
month earlier it had just held, through use of the implicit-divestiture 
doctrine, that Indian tribes had no authority to prosecute non-Indi-
ans.228 The Court in Merrion seemed to overtly reject the implicit-
divestiture doctrine once and for all. In Merrion, the Court first 
quoted a Senate report from 1879 presaging the Cohen formulation: 
"We have considered [Indian tribes] as invested with the right of self-
government and jurisdiction over the persons and property within the 
limits ofthe territory they occupy, except so far as that Jurisdiction has 
been restrained and abridged by treaty or act of Congress."229 Citing 
Wheeler, the Court then stated, "Only the Federal Government may 
limit a tribe's exercise of its sovereign authority."23o This is consistent 
with the Cohen formulation that only Congress, through legislation, 
or the Executive Branch, in negotiating a treaty or other agreement, 
can divest an Indian tribe of inherent sovereignty, but it does not ex-
clude the federal courts. When confronted with the argument that the 
tribe in Merrion had been implicitly divested of its inherent power, the 
Court, following the above-stated rule, looked only to the acts of Con-
gress.231 Upon finding no act of Congress divesting the tribe of its 
relevant inherent authority, the Court concluded that there had been 
no divestiture.232 In fact, the Court declared in a footnote, "Because 
the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not 
been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from 
silence ... is that the sovereign power ... remains intact."233 At the 
conclusion of the majority opinion, the Court stated, "[T]he Tribe may 
enforce its severance tax unless and until Congress divests this power, 
ity to prosecute nonmember Indians); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 191 (1978) (deciding that Indian tribes do not possess the authority to prose-
cute non-Indians). 
225. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
226. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
227. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. 
228. See id. (citing Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191). 
229. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 140 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 45-698, at 1-2 (1879)). 
230. Id. at 147 (citing Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322). 
231. See id. at 149-52. 
232. See id. at 152. 
233. Id. at 148 n.14. 
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an action that Congress has not taken to date. "234 Affirming the adop-
tion of the Cohen formulation in Merrion, the Court stated in Iowa 
Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,235 "Civil jurisdiction over [the ac-
tivities of non-Indians on reservation land] presumptively lies in the 
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision 
or federal statute."236 
It appears that, with Merrion, followed by Iowa Mutual, the Court 
had chosen to restrict-if not eliminate altogether-its implicit-di-
vestiture doctrine. However, given that Wheeler was decided at the 
same time as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the first shocking 
implicit-divestiture decision of the modern era, and given further that 
Merrion has been virtually ignored by the Court since its filing237 and 
the statement in Iowa Mutual was explicitly discredited by the 
Court,238 it is safe to say that Cohen's normative statement is only 
part of the law. 
Even the Court is uncertain or unclear on when the implicit-divest-
iture doctrine applies. Borrowing from the notion in Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia239 that Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations,"240 
a formulation necessary for Chief Justice Marshall to reach his conclu-
sions in the Marshall Trilogy,241 the Court now holds that Indian 
tribes do not retain authority "inconsistent with their [dependent sta-
tus] ."242 But in 1980, the Court decided the landmark Indian taxation 
case Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reserva-
tion,243 noting: 
234. Id. at 159 (emphasis added). 
235. 480 U.S. 9 (1987). 
236. Id. at 18 (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148 n.14; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 
436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978». 
237. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) (referring to Merrion as a "minor 
exception"). 
238. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997) ("[TJhe statement stands 
for nothing more than the unremarkable proposition that, where tribes possess 
authority to regulate the activities of nonmembers, '[clivi! jurisdiction over [dis-
putes arising out of] such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts.'" 
(quoting Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18)). But see Hicks, 533 U.S. at 358 n.2 ("Our 
holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-court jurisdiction over state 
officers enforcing state law. We leave open the question of tribal-court jurisdic-
tion over nonmember defendants in general."). 
239. 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
240. Id. at 17. 
241. The three cases comprise the origins of federal Indian law and the critical opin-
ions are all authored by Chief Justice John Marshall. See Worcester v. Georgia, 
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); 
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
242. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 229 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)); see Hicks, 533 U.S. at 359 
(quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981). 
243. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
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Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent sta-
tus. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases where the exercise of 
tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the 
National Government, as when the tribes seek to engage in foreign relations, 
alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal consent, or prosecute non-
Indians in tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of the Bill of 
Rights.244 
In Colville, the Court concluded that Indian tribes could be implicitly 
divested of their inherent authority only when the exercise of that au-
thority is inconsistent with the overriding interests of the national 
government. If we take Johnson as an example of a case where the 
Court had no choice but to validate the actions of the young American 
government, as some have,245 then one can make the argument that 
Johnson is an example of implicit divestiture under the consistent-
with-overriding-national-interest test. 
But the more recent cases, Hicks among them, have restated that 
rule much more expansively from a consistent-with-overriding-na-
tional-interest test to consistency with a tribe's dependent status. 
Considering that Congress has frequently declared tribal-court juris-
diction and tribal-government development to be consistent with na-
tional interest,246 and that Indian tribes are now less dependent on 
the federal government than in the last century or more, it makes no 
sense for the Court to adopt this new consistency-with-dependent-sta-
tus test. 
What authority is "inconsistent" with the status of Indian tribes as 
"dependent"? The Court and the Court alone decides what authority 
is inconsistent with the dependent status of Indian tribes. The Court 
has disregarded the Congress and Executive Branch statements of 
federal Indian policy in favor of its own policy choices. 
B. The Court Doubts that Tribal Economic Development 
and Taxation Authority are Tribal Government 
Necessities 
The Rehnquist Court's preference for the authority of states and 
the rights of nonmembers in Indian Country becomes clearest in the 
context of taxation and regulation. The Warren Court's jurisprudence 
in this area generated the per se rule in Williams v. Lee247 that Indi-
ans are free to make their own laws and be governed by them within 
Indian Country.248 Further, under Williams, state laws that conflict 
244. [d. at 153--54 (emphasis added). 
245. See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expro-
priation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (2000) (arguing that 
Johnson created a source of revenue for the new American federal government). 
246. See supra subsection II.B.3. 
247. 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
248. See id. at 220, 223. 
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with this right to self-government are preempted by federal law.249 
Unfortunately for those in favor of a bright-line rule, then-Justice 
Rehnquist opened the door to state authority in Indian Country by 
announcing a watering-down of the Williams test in Moe v. Confeder-
ated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation.250 
In Moe, then-Justice Rehnquist wrote that an Indian retailer sell-
ing cigarettes to non-Indians free from state taxes was not free to, as 
he characterized it, "flout" state law in order to reap "the competitive 
advantage which the Indian seller doing business on tribal land enjoys 
over all other cigarette retailers, within and without the reserva-
tion."251 The Court required Indian traders to collect state cigarette 
taxes from non-Indians for the first time in its history.252 The Court 
acknowledged that Congress had intended for Indians and Indian 
tribes to trade without the burden of state interference,253 but held 
that the interest extended only to trading between Indians.254 
The Court has taken then-Justice Rehnquist's concern about the 
alleged "competitive advantage" that Indian retailers might have and 
adopted a whole line of cases castigating Indians and Indian tribes for 
"marketing" an "exemption" from state taxation or regulation.255 In 
short, because the Court in Moe questioned the public policy of 
whether Indians and Indian tribes should be allowed to maintain a 
competitive advantage by marketing an exemption from state taxation 
and regulation, that suspicion has now become the law. Given that 
Congress was aware of cases such as Williams and Worcester that 
drew a wall around Indian Country keeping out state laws and did 
nothing, the Court by negative implication256 could easily have left 
Indians retailers alone. If Congress wanted to make a change, then 
the Court would wait until that day. But it chose to impose its own 
policy choice upon Indian retailers. 
249. See id. at 220. 
250. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
251. [d. at 482. 
252. See id. at 483. 
253. See id. at 482 (citing Warren Trading Post Co. v. Ariz. Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 
686, 691 (1965)). 
254. See id. 
255. See Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 72 (1994); 
Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 155 
(1980); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. Arizona, 50 F.3d 734, 737 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (citing Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 800 
F.2d 1446, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986)); Squaxin Island Tribe v. Washington, 781 F.2d 
715, 720 (9th Cir. 1986); Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation V. Richards, 241 F. 
Supp. 2d 1295, 1310 (D. Kan. 2003), rev'd, 379 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2004), rev'd 
sub nom., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 126 S. Ct. 676 (2005); Sac 
& Fox Nation v. Richards, 158 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277 (D. Kan. 2001); United 
States V. Finn, 919 F. Supp. 1305, 1340 (D. Minn. 1995). 
256. See Frickey, supra note 30, at 1157--58 (arguing that "negative inferences" are 
"weak" arguments). 
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The policy choices made by the Court have gone only one way since 
then: against tribal retailers. The question of competitive advantage 
does not work both ways. In Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,257 
the Court held that states may tax the on-reservation business activi-
ties of non-Indian-owned businesses, even where the tribe was already 
imposing its own tax.258 This result was presaged by cases such as 
Moe, but the impact on Indian tribes has been nothing short of devas-
tating. Cotton Petroleum authorized a system of double taxation that 
works to the extreme detriment of Indian tribes.259 Professor Philip 
Frickey noted that Congress had once authorized state taxation in this 
circumstance in 1927, but then repealed that law in favor of another 
in 1938, this time without language authorizing state taxation.26o 
Professor Frickey noted, "[Al good argument arises on the face of the 
statutes that Congress knew how to authorize state taxation and 
failed to do SO."261 The Court could have noted these statutes and re-
lied upon implicit congressional intent through negative implication, 
but it chose not to. 
With the Court deciding that states were authorized to tax and 
regulate the activities of non-Indians in Indian Country-a clear re-
versal of congressional policy to the contrary-the Court opened the 
door to double-taxation and the evisceration of nascent tribal econo-
mies. This result conflicts with express federal Indian policy in favor 
of tribal self-sufficiency.262 
As noted earlier, the mass of the Rehnquist Court's Indian cases 
are decided in accordance with federal common law. The Court's 
doubts as to the constitutional authority for congressional plenary 
power, tribal inherent authority, and the contours of Indian Country 
supply a motivation to revisit each case reaching the Court anew. In 
short, the lack of constitutional grounding for federal Indian law 
opens the door to new Supreme Court precedent. Since nothing in the 
Constitution prevents or even discourages the Court from making pol-
257. 490 U.S. 163 (1989). 
258. See id. at 173. 
259. See Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, supra note 64, at 1216-24; 
Frickey, supra note 30, at 1189 n.263; Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in 
Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over Mineral Resources, 29 
TuLSA L.J. 541, 579 (1994); Valencia-Weber, supra note 56, at 420 n.52; Gloria 
Valencia-Weber, Shrinking Indian Country: A State Offensive to Divest Tribal 
Sovereignty, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1318 (1995); Susan M. Williams, State Taxa-
tion on Indian Reservations: The Impact of Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New 
Mexico, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 431 (1989). 
260. See Frickey, supra note 30, at 1189 n.263 (comparing Indian Oil Act of 1927,25 
U.S.C. § 398e (2000), with Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. 
§§ 396a-396g (2000)). 
261. Id. 
262. See supra subsection II.B.2. 
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icy choices, there is no respect for stare decisis in the Court's Indian 
cases. 
A quick review of the cases discussed in this Article establishes a 
few of the Court's policy choices. First, the Court is suspicious of the 
authority asserted by Indian tribes over nonmembers.263 In line with 
its "states' rights" decisions, the Court tends to vacate tribal exercises 
of authority, either opening the door to state authority in Indian 
Country264 or purposefully leaving a vacuum for Congress to fill.265 
Second, the Court has acted to protect the economic interests of non-
Indians, non-Indian-owned companies, and the tax base of state and 
local governments-all at the direct expense of tribal economic and 
taxation interests.266 In Indian Country, the Court tends to draw the 
lines in terms of economic competition and fairness against Indians 
and Indian tribes. 
It seems clear that Congress has strongly supported the exercise of 
tribal sovereign authority in regulatory, taxation, adjudicatory juris-
diction, and in tribal economic development through its legislative au-
thority, but also in its authority to declare the federal Indian policy for 
the nation. But the Court does not weigh seriously the congressional 
statements of federal Indian policy in its decisions, choosing to apply 
its own policies and preferences. As Professor Joe Singer wrote: 
[T]he Court is increasingly reluctant to recognize the special rights that go 
along with the special status of Indian nations. At the same time, the Court 
also often fails to accord Indian nations the same rights as others in cases 
where the tribes are indeed similarly situated to non-Indians.267 
IV. THE MIDDLE GROUND-PRE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY OVER 
INDIAN AFFAIRS 
Without a path to follow, the Supreme Court moves on as before. 
In the area of Indian law, the Court does not have policy guidance to 
follow that it trusts-that is, guidance from Congress-nor textual 
guidance from the Constitution. As Part IV demonstrates, the Court 
has taken the mantle oflead federal Indian policymaker, or as Profes-
263. See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 14, at 114-21; Frickey, supra note 199, at 45-46; 
Singer, supra note 36, at 666~7. 
264. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mex-
ico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989); Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Moe v. Confed. Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the 
Flathead Reserv'n, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
265. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001); Strate v. A-I Con-
tractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997). 
266. See, e.g., Atkinson Trading, 532 U.S. 645; Cotton Petrol., 490 U.S. 163; Confed. 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134; Moe, 425 U.S. 463. 
267. Singer, supra note 27, at 3. 
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sors Frank Pommersheim and Robert Clinton artfully noted, adopted 
the doctrine of ''judicial plenary power."268 
A. The Court Doubts the Existence of Congressional 
Plenary and Exclusive Power over Indian Affairs 
The Justices on the Rehnquist Court were as focused on locating a 
source of textual support for the authority exercised by Congress as 
any Court in the history of Supreme Court jurisprudence.269 And 
where there is textual support for congressional action, the Rehnquist 
Court tended to read the language narrowly.270 Its most controversial 
cases relevant to this discussion are the cases relating to the Com-
merce Clause. For the first time since the Lochner-era Court, the 
Rehnquist Court invalidated acts of Congress as exceeding its author-
ity under the Commerce Clause.271 The Court's decision in Seminole 
Tribe of Florida v. Florida,272 a watershed Eleventh Amendment deci-
sion in favor of states' rights, also foreshadowed the limits of the In-
dian Commerce Clause as a grant of authority to Congress.273 
This development is critical to federal Indian policy because the 
sole source of explicit textual authority from which Congress may 
draw upon to legislate in the area of Indian affairs is the Indian Com-
merce Clause.274 In few (if any) other areas of federal policy is Con-
gress so limited. For example, in the area of civil rights, by contrast, 
Congress may also draw upon its enforcement authority under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.275 The Constitution does not in-
clude a similarly broad grant of authority to Congress to legislate on 
Indian affairs.276 
268. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 214; Pommer-
sheim, supra note 25, at 328; see also Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, 
supra note 27, at 460 (noting that "some Justices ... suggest that the Court, not 
Congress, should have the final say about some matters"). 
269. See generally Michael C. Dorf, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARv. L. 
REV. 4,16-17 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statu-
tory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 405 (1991). 
270. See generally Schwartz, supra note 57. 
271. See Schwartz, supra note 57, at 165-66 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549 (1995)); Dorf, supra note 269, at 64. 
272. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
273. See TuSHNET, supra note 6, at 52-53. 
274. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3; Riley, supra note 143, at 205. 
275. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
276. For more detailed discussion of the origins of the Indian Commerce Clause and 
its purpose, see Cleveland, supra note 56; Clinton, There Is No Federal 
Supremacy Clause, supra note 56; Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce 
Clause, supra note 64; Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest, supra note 56; 
N. Bruce Duthu, The Thurgood Marshall Papers and the Quest for a Principled 
Theory of Tribal Sovereignty: Fueling the Fires of TriballState Conflict, 21 VT. L. 
REV. 47 (1996); Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian 
Commerce Clause, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 29 (1997); Getches, Beyond Indian Law, 
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Ironically, despite the inherent limits of the text of the Indian 
Commerce Clause, the Court held for almost a century that Congress 
had unlimited and exclusive authority to determine federal Indian 
policy and law277-and even the authority to regulate the internal af-
fairs of Indian tribes.278 To this day, the federal courts continue to 
affirm that Congress has plenary and exclusive authority.279 The un-
limited and absolute nature of this authority was moderated only by 
the imposition of a rational basis test in 1977.280 The plenary power 
of Congress in Indian affairs has generated an enormous amount of 
vociferous scholarly debate in the federal Indian law academic com-
munity, with the argument that Congress has no business regulating 
at least the internal affairs of Indian tribes being most popular.281 
It is now clear that many statutes contained in Title 25 rest on the 
plenary and exclusive authority of Congress to legislate in this area 
that the Court has always recognized.282 The Justices are not una-
ware of the precarious nature of congressional authority. Justice 
Thomas, for example, argued recently in United States v. Lara that 
congressional plenary power is a doctrine without firm textual footing 
supra note 27; Richard Monette, When Tribes Sue States: How "Federal Indian 
Law" Offers an Opportunity to Clarify Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 14 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 401 (1994); and Skibine, supra note 36. 
277. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,200 (2004); Negonsott v. Samuels, 
507 U.S. 99, 103 (1993); Cotton Petrol. Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 
(1989); Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982); 
Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 136 
(1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); Mor-
ton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of 
Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 
(1903). 
278. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902); United States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375 (1886); Comment, Federal Plenary Power in Indian Affairs After 
Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 235, 246-50 (1982). 
279. See, e.g., United States v. Gregg, No. CR 04-30068, 2005 WL 1806345, at *1 
(D.S.D. July 27, 2005). 
280. See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1977). 
281. See supra note 56. 
282. See generally Morton, 417 U.S. at 552 ("Literally every piece oflegislation dealing 
with Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the 
BIA, single out for special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or 
near reservations. If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explic-
itly designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, 
an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased 
and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians would be 
jeopardized."); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) (sug-
gesting that Congress has a "compelling interest" in legislating for the benefit of 
Indian tribes). 
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and should be revisited.283 This debate is moving from the ivory 
tower to the Supreme Court-and in short order. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Indian Commerce 
Clause alone does not confer plenary power upon Congress. In the 
very first case in which the Court could be said to acknowledge con-
gressional plenary power, United States v. Kagama,284 the Court ex-
plicitly stated that the grant of authority to Congress under the 
Indian Commerce Clause was insufficient to authorize the Major 
Crimes Act,285 which extended federal criminal jurisdiction into In-
dian Country.286 Nevertheless, the Court did find sufficient congres-
sional authority in another source-Indian treaties.287 More 
specifically, because Indian tribes had sometimes given themselves up 
to the protection of the United States in treaties, the Court construed 
the word "protection" to mean "dependence."288 It was the "depen-
dence" of Indian tribes upon the federal government that authorized 
Congress to take this action. It is as if one tribe's "dependence" 
amounted to all tribes' dependence.289 
After Lone Wolf, the Court did not question congressional plenary 
power until the 1970s, asserting that the political-question doctrine 
283. See 541 U.S. 193, 224, 226 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); see also id. at 219 
("The tribes, by contrast, are not part ofthis constitutional order, and their sover-
eignty is not guaranteed by it."). 
284. 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
285. [d. at 378-79 ("But we think it would be a very strained construction of [the In-
dian Commerce] [C]lause that a system of criminal laws for Indians living peace-
ably in their reservations, which left out the entire code of trade and intercourse 
laws justly enacted under that provision, and established punishments for the 
common-law crimes of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny, and the 
like, without any reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was author-
ized by the grant of power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes."). 
286. Indian Appropriation Act of 1885, 23 Stat. 385 (1885). 
287. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84. 
288. See id. at 384 (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)). It is clear, how-
ever, that in Worcester, the Court construed the word "protection" as used in the 
Treaty of Hopewell. See Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee Nation art. III, 7 
Stat. 18 (1785), reprinted in CLINTON, GoLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 5 
("The said Indians for themselves and their respective tribes and towns do ac-
knowledge all the Cherokees to be under the protection of the United States of 
America, and of no other sovereign whosoever." (emphasis added)). In short, in 
that treaty, "protection" amounts to little more than a declaration ofloyalty. The 
treaty went on, in Article 5, to also note that non-Indians who move onto Chero-
kee territory without their permission "forfeit the protection of the United States, 
and the Indians may punish him or not as they please." [d. This is prototype 
treaty language implementing "measured separatism," as defined by Wilkinson. 
See supra note 71. This is not "dependence," as the Kagama Court alleged, espe-
cially given that the Cherokee Nation had developed an extremely sophisticated 
government and was "dependent" on no one. See GETCHES, WILKINSON & WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 1, at 96. 
289. See Prakash, supra note 9, at 1071 ("To the 'Courts of the conqueror,' Indian 
tribes are all the same." (quoting Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823))). 
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precluded the Court from second-guessing the choices made by Con-
gress and the Executive in federal Indian policy.29o 
B. A Preconstitutional Congressional Power to Legislate in 
Indian Affairs? 
Since Kagama, the Court has not delved deeply into the sources of 
congressional authority over and with Indian tribes. The Court in 
United States v. Lara articulated for the first time a notion that con-
gressional plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs is author-
ized by "preconstitutional powers necessarily inherent in a Federal 
Government, namely, powers that this Court has described as 'neces-
sary concomitants of nationality."'291 
For this proposition, the Court cited United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.292 The Court in Curtiss-Wright stated: 
[T)he investment of the federal government with the powers of external 
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. 
The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to 
maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been 
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government 
as necessary concomitants of nationality.293 
In Lara, the Court did not indulge in the formulism with which the 
Rehnquist Court has often resorted. But the problem is that the 
"pre constitutional" authority the Court recognized in Lara is therefore 
unlimited and unconstrained except by the Court itself. Nothing in the 
Constitution constrains Congress or the Court because there is noth-
ing in the Constitution. The Court has extended to Congress, finally, 
a modern theory as to why the federal government has authority over 
Indian tribes, but in doing so it has also extended that power to itself. 
Professor Pommersheim's prediction or observation of a "judicial ple-
nary power" appears to have found further hold in this notion of a 
"preconstitutional" power to deal with Indian tribes. 
The result in Lara no doubt was a powerful victory for Indian 
tribes and the United States.294 The Court concluded that Congress 
does indeed have the power to ratchet up tribal inherent authority, 
recognizing congressional authority to reverse the Court's implicit-di-
290. See supra Part II. 
291. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,201-02 (2004) (quoting United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936), citing Worcester, 31 U.S. at 
557). See also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
14-22, 63-72 (2d ed. 1996); see generally 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CON· 
GRESS 1774-1789 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1905). 
292. 299 U.S. 304. 
293. Id. at 318. 
294. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Affirmation of Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Over 
Nonmember American Indians, MICH. B.J., July 2004, at 24, 26; Washburn, 
supra note 56, at 25. 
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vestiture cases. But Congress essentially codified the implicit-divesti-
ture doctrine in its Duro fix-and the Court approved that 
formulation. In short, there is no going back from implicit divestiture 
and perhaps Cohen's normative statement is a dead letter. And, as 
Professor Kevin Washburn stated, "Even though Lara was a victory in 
an immediate sense, it moves tribes further down a doctrinal dead end 
if the ultimate goal is a return to the constitutionally-envisaged role 
for Indian tribes."295 
The adoption and recognition of this "preconstitutional" federal 
government power is satisfactory for the time being. But with two 
new Justices heading to the Court and textualist Justices Scalia and 
Thomas doubting the existence of such a "preconstitutional" power, 
this doctrine might wither on the vine. Another theory is required. 
V. CONSISTENT-WITH-FEDERAL-POLICY TEST 
With several Justices questioning the foundations offederal Indian 
law and with new appointees heading to the Court, the time is ripe for 
a reconsideration of the Court's role as federal Indian policymaker. 
Other commentators have suggested massive changes in federal In-
dian law, including the following: a constitutional amendment protect-
ing tribal sovereignty or explicitly providing for broad congressional 
authority;296 congressional legislation authorizing federal courts to 
provide a limited review of tribal court decisions;297 tribal or congres-
sionallegislation expanding nonmember political rights within Indian 
Country;298 a new paradigm of reviewing Indian cases;299 or either an 
act of Congress or a Supreme Court opinion finding that Indian tribes 
are simply no longer sovereign.30o The solution, however, must be one 
295. Washburn, supra note 56, at 43. But see United States v. Gregg, No. CR 04-
30068,2005 WL 1806345, at *1 (D.S.D. July 27,2005) ("I reject the argument of 
defendant that Morrison and Lopez have by way of implication overruled the 
'wards of the nation' holdings in a line of cases beginning with United States v. 
Kagama." (citation omitted». 
296. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS (1995); Pommersheim, supra note 
36, at 757--58. 
297. See L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Tribal Sovereignty After 
Atkinson and Hicks, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 685 (2003) (reporting that the 
National Congress of American Indians might propose congressional legislation 
allowing limited federal court review of tribal court decisions). 
298. See Skibine, supra note 36, at 34 (reporting a tribal attempt to lobby for a "Hicks 
fix"). 
299. See Frickey, supra note 30, at 1142; Washburn, supra note 56, at 43. 
300. Cf United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,226 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We 
might find that the Federal Government cannot regulate the tribes through ordi-
nary domestic legislation and simultaneously maintain that the tribes are sover-
eigns in any meaningful sense."). 
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with "sufficient cultural connection [with] roots deep enough to with-
stand the inevitable conflicting pressures."301 
This Article proposes something much simpler and more fair-the 
partial adoption of the test proposed by Justice Thomas in his concur-
rence in United States v. Lara-the consistent-with-federal-policy 
test. It would allow the Court to review exercises of inherent tribal 
authority with a semblance of consistency under a rubric of its own 
making. 
A. Justice Thomas's Lara Concurrence 
United States v. Lara302 involved an appeal of a federal conviction 
of Billy Jo Lara for assaulting a federal law enforcement officer.303 
Mr. Lara, a member of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indi-
ans, had been excluded from the Spirit Lake Tribe's reservation due to 
a series of domestic violence convictions.304 He returned to the Spirit 
Lake reservation and then assaulted an arresting officer who was 
cross-deputized as both a tribal and federal officer.305 Mter the tribe 
convicted Mr. Lara of assaulting the officer, the federal government 
prosecuted him for the same offense.306 Mr. Lara argued that the fed-
eral prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.307 
Normally, concurrent tribal and federal prosecutions are not 
barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause under the dual-sovereignty ex-
ception.30s The Court had previously affirmed that Indian tribes had 
inherent authority to prosecute tribal members,309 but not non-Indi-
ans310 or people classified as "nonmember Indians."311 Since Mr. 
Lara is a "nonmember Indian," the Court would have held that the 
Spirit Lake Tribe had no inherent authority to prosecute him under 
Duro v. Reina.312 
301. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 488 (citing Robert 
C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Consti-
tution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARv_ L. REV. 4 (2003)). 
302. 541 U.S. 193_ 
303. See id. at 197. 
304. See United States v. Lara, No. C2-01-58, 2001 WL 1789403, at *1 (D.N.D. Nov. 
29, 2001); Fletcher, supra note 294 at 24, 26. 
305. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 196-97. 
306. See id. at 197. 
307. See id. 
308. See id. (citing Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)); United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 332 (1978) (upholding concurrent tribal and federal prose-
cutions of a tribal member). 
309. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322-23. 
310. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
311. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990). 
312. See id. However, as Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence, Mr. Lara never 
appealed his tribal court conviction. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 214 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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However, Congress attempted to reverse (or at least rectify) Duro 
in 1991 by enacting amendments to the Indian Civil Rights Act that 
would "'recognize and affirm' in each tribe the 'inherent' tribal power 
(not delegated federal power) to prosecute nonmember Indians for 
misdemeanors."3l3 Lara's argument was that once the Court made a 
determination that a tribe's inherent authority had been implicitly 
divested, no act of Congress could reverse that determination.3l4 As 
such, the authority exercised by the Spirit Lake Tribe was delegated 
federal authority, not inherent tribal authority.3l5 A finding that Con-
gress had merely delegated its authority to Indian tribes would make 
the federal prosecution unconstitutional under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. 
The real question in Lara was whether Congress could reverse a 
determination by the Court that a portion of tribal inherent authority 
had been implicitly divested by the Court through the re-affirmation 
oftribal inherent authority. The Court concluded that Congress could 
re-affirm that authority.3l6 
Lara was a 7-2 decision, suggesting that it stands on firm prece-
dential footing for the time being, even with two new Justices on the 
Court. But upon closer review, at least one of the Justices in the ma-
jority, Justice Kennedy, ruled on the narrow grounds that Mr. Lara 
had not appealed his tribal court conviction-a position to which Jus-
tice Thomas was sympathetic.3l7 Justice Kennedy, in particular, 
would have voted the other way if the matter had reached the Court 
upon direct appeal by Mr. Lara of his tribal court conviction.3l8 
Justice Thomas questions whether Congress has plenary and ex-
clusive authority over Indian affairs as opposed to the Executive 
313. Lara, 541 U.S. at 199 (citations and alterations omitted). This was known as the 
"Duro fIx." See LaRock v. Wis. Dept. of Revenue, 621 N.W.2d 907, 914 (Wis. 
2001); see generally Alex TallchiefSkibine, Duro v. Reina and the Legislation that 
Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 767 
(1993). 
314. This is the holding of the Eighth Circuit sitting en banco See United States V. 
Lara, 324 F.3d 635, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
315. See id. However, as noted by the Assistant United States Attorney who prose-
cuted the matter, Janice Morley, see Fletcher, supra note 294, at 26, the United 
States circumvented Mr. Lara's strategy to rely on the Double Jeopardy Clause 
by arguing that the tribal conviction was either done through inherent tribal au-
thority or was not valid at all. See Brief for the United States at 43-44, United 
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (No. 03-107), 2003 WL 22811829. In any 
event, Mr. Lara's strategy would have resulted in the affirmation of his convic-
tion regardless of whether the Duro fIx was constitutional. 
316. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 196. 
317. See id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 217 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
318. See id. at 211 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (calling "most doubtful" the court's hold-
ing that "the Constitution authorizes Congress to permit tribes, as an exercise of 
their inherent tribal authority, to prosecute nonmember Indians"). 
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Branch and, implicitly, the states.319 He questions whether Indian 
tribes retain any inherent sovereignty at a1l320 and questions Indian 
law decisions that tribes have held in reverence for decades, such as 
United States v. Wheeler.321 Given these breathtaking comments, it 
should be no surprise that Justice Thomas's concurrence has been ad-
dressed in numerous commentaries since its publication.322 
Nevertheless, contained within Justice Thomas's concurrence are 
the seeds for a very useful paradigm for the Court to use when analyz-
ing its Indian law cases. For Justice Thomas, the cases underlying 
Lara-United States v. Wheeler and Duro v. Reina-"make clear that 
conflict with federal policy can operate to prohibit the exercise of [tri-
bal inherent] sovereignty."323 In fact, Justice Thomas argues Oli-
phant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe is a case that exemplifies the 
Court's reliance on the "views of Congress and the Executive 
Branch."324 Oliphant and Duro are not cases about "inherent sover-
eignty"-they are "classic federal-common-Iaw decisions"325 in which 
the Court must examine the underlying federal Indian policy. Justice 
Thomas, in a critical passage, points out that certain "authoritative 
pronouncements of the political branches make clear that the exercise 
of [inherent tribal] sovereignty is not inconsistent with federal pol-
icy."326 In other words, because Congress has no clear textual author-
ity to limit or authorize the exercise of tribal inherent authority, the 
Court is left not to enforce or uphold the actual legislation, but the 
underlying federal Indian policy. As such, if the exercise of tribal in-
herent sovereignty conflicts with expressed federal Indian policy, only 
then would the Court invalidate exercises of tribal inherent 
sovereignty. 
319. See id. at 218-19 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("But the States (unlike the tribes) are 
part of a constitutional framework that allocates sovereignty between the State 
and Federal Governments and specifically grants Congress authority to legislate 
with respect to them ... ." (citing U.S. CONST., amend. XN, § 5». 
320. See id. at 219 ("The tribes, by contrast, are not part of this constitutional order, 
and their sovereignty is not guaranteed by it."). 
321. See id. at 215 ("I believe that the result in Wheeler is questionable."). 
322. See Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 
TuLSA L. REV. 5, 23 (2004); Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra 
note 27, at 470-72; Robert Laurence, Don't Think ofa Hippopotamus: An Essay 
on First Year Contracts, Earthquake Prevention, Gun Control in Baghdad, the 
Indian Civil Rights Act, the Clean Water Act, and Justice Thomas's Separate 
Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 TuLSA L. REV. 137, 146-53 (2004); Alex 
TallchiefSkibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic of Incor-
poration, 40 TuLSA L. REV. 47, 53 (2004); Melissa L. Tatum, Foreward, Sympo-
sium: Tribal Sovereignty and United States v. Lara, 40 TuLSA L. REV. 1, 3-4 
(2004); Washburn, supra note 56, at 42. 
323. Lara, 541 U.S. at 220-21 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
324. Id. at 221. 
325. Id. at 220. 
326. Id. at 222. 
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Justice Thomas explains that tribal inherent authority in Indian 
Country remains vested because, as "[p]urely 'internal' matters," they 
are "unlikely to implicate federal policy."327 In contrast, the exercise 
of tribal inherent sovereignty outside the borderlines of Indian Coun-
try and the exercise of tribal inherent sovereignty that affects non-
members implicates federal Indian policy. In Lara, Congress made a 
clear statement of federal Indian policy sufficient to satisfy Justice 
Thomas for the time being-"[s]pecifically, Congress 'recognized and 
affirmed' the existence of 'inherent power ... to exercise criminal ju-
risdiction over all Indians."'328 
Justice Thomas, despite the thinly veiled warnings that he would 
vote to eradicate congressional acts in favor of tribal sovereignty if 
provided the opportunity (perhaps with a petitioner challenging the 
constitutionality of the Indian Civil Rights Act329), acknowledges that 
federal Indian policy as articulated by Congress might be sufficient to 
permit tribes to exercise certain forms of inherent authority. 
B. Explicit Federal Indian Policy Should Drive Federal 
Indian Common Law Relating to the Inherent 
Authority of Indian Tribes 
Misgivings about the motivations of Justice Thomas aside, the con-
sistent-with-federal-policy test provides an excellent avenue for re-
storing certainty and predictability in federal Indian law and re-
establishes Congress as the primary federal Indian policymaker, re-
lieving the Court of this burden and temptation. This test mostly 
avoids the problem of a lack of constitutional grounding for congres-
sional authority in Indian affairs while respecting the intent of the 
Founders to provide exclusive authority to the federal government. 
Finally, the test provides the "fairly clean analytical structure"330 the 
Court has been seeking since the Marshall Trilogy itself. 
Yet, Justice Thomas omits mention of examples of cases consistent 
with this test-Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,331 New Mexico v. 
Mescalero Apache Tribe,332 and California v. Cabazon Band of Mis-
sion Indians.333 Merrion involved the inherent authority of Indian 
tribes to exercise the governmental power to tax-in that case, non-
327. [d. at 221. 
328. [d. at 222 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000)). 
329. See Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenge to 
the constitutionality of the prosecution of a nonmember Indian in accordance 
with the Indian Civil Rights Act); Morris v. Tanner, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1133 (D. 
Mont. 2003) (same). 
330. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984). 
331. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). 
332. 462 U.S. 324 (1983). 
333. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). 
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Indian-owned businesses.334 The Court identified the relevant con-
gressional federal Indian policy as "'fostering tribal government'''335 
in concluding that "'[i]t simply does not make sense to expect the 
tribes to carry out municipal functions approved and mandated by 
Congress without being able to exercise at least minimal taxing pow-
ers, whether they take the form of real estate taxes, leasehold taxes or 
severance taxes.'''336 The Merrion Court also quoted from an 1879 
Senate Judiciary Committee report that articulated the Committee's 
understanding that Indian tribes "undoubtedly" retain the inherent 
right to taxation.337 
The Mescalero Apache Court relied on the Executive Branch's ac-
tions as well as the explicit statements offederal Indian policy by Con-
gress. That case decided that the State of New Mexico's attempt to 
enforce its hunting and fishing laws against individuals who engaged 
in those activities on tribal lands had been pre-empted by the opera-
tion of federal law.338 The Court noted that the economic develop-
ment activities undertaken by the tribe had been financed and 
supported by federal agencies under federal law, such as the Indian 
Financing Act.339 The Court's analysis relied on congressional state-
ments of federal Indian policy in favor of tribal self-governance and 
tribal economic development.34o Indeed, the Court concluded, as it 
had in earlier cases, that congressional federal Indian policy in favor 
of "tribal self-sufficiency and economic development" was 
"overriding."341 
In Cabazon Band the Court rejected the State of California's at-
tempt to impose its laws and regulations relating to tribal high-stakes 
bingo.342 The Court relied on the statements of congressional federal 
Indian policy, noted in the Mescalero Apache decision, that Congress's 
334. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 134--36. 
335. [d. at 138 n.5 (quoting Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian 
Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 155 (1980». 
336. [d. (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980) (Mc-
Kay, J., concurring), affd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)). 
337. [d. at 140 (quoting S. REP. No. 45-698, at 1-2 (1879)). 
338. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325 (1983). 
339. See id. at 327 n.3 ("Financing for the complex, the Inn of Mountain Gods, came 
principally from the Economic Development Administration (EDA), an agency of 
the United States Department of Commerce, and other federal sources. In addi-
tion, the Tribe obtained a $6 million loan from the Bank of New Mexico, 90% of 
which was guaranteed by the Secretary of the Interior under the Indian Financ-
ing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1543, and 10% of which was guaranteed by 
Tribal funds. Certain additional facilities at the Inn were completely funded by 
the EDA as public works projects, and other facilities received 50% funding from 
the EDA."). 
340. See id. at 335 n.17. 
341. [d. at 335 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 
(1980». 
342. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987). 
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interest in encouraging "tribal self-sufficiency and economic develop-
ment" was "overriding."343 Moreover, the Court relied on the fact that 
the Executive Branch had encouraged and even assisted Indian tribes 
in developing gaming operations for economIC development 
purposes.344 
Merrion, Mescalero Apache, and Cabazon Band took seriously ex-
plicit congressional statements of federal Indian policy and Executive 
Branch actions in concluding that the exercise of tribal inherent au-
thority was consistent with federal Indian policy. Under such a test, 
congressional federal Indian policy permits Indian tribes to regulate 
nonmembers. The Court reached its holding utilizing an analysis con-
ducive to Justice Thomas's proposal to rely on statements of congres-
sional policy. The following subsections take up Justice Thomas's 
suggestion to revisit critical federal Indian law cases,345 by applying 
the consistent-with-federal-policy test. 
1. Revisiting Hicks and Its "Open" Question 
In Nevada v. Hicks,346 the Supreme Court held that tribal courts 
do not have jurisdiction over a civil suit brought by a tribal member 
against a state officer for actions taken on Indian lands.347 That deci-
sion has been subject to intense scholarly criticism,348 but not on the 
question of whether the Court complied with explicit statements of 
federal Indian policy. In fact, the majority opinion in Hicks did not 
discuss federal Indian policy at all. 
If one were to analyze the decision in Hicks under the consistent-
with-federal-policy test, one would ask if Congress stated a policy that 
would permit an Indian tribe to exercise civil jurisdiction over a state 
officer. The place to start is the Tribal Justice Act.349 Subsections 4 
through 6 of Congress's statement of federal Indian policy contained 
in the Act support the view that Indian tribes have inherent civil adju-
343. Id. at 216 & n.19 (citing New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 
335 n.17 (1983)). 
344. See id. at 217-18. 
345. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
346. 533 U.S. 353 (2001). 
347. Id. at 374. 
348. See Robert N. Clinton, Comity and Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Frustration 
of Tribal-Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 37 (2004); Clinton, There Is 
No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 229-34; Getches, Beyond Indian 
Law, supra note 27, at 278-79, 329-36; Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One 
Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 
1177, 1233-37 (2001); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and Federal Courts: A 
Very Preliminary Set of Notes for Federal Courts Teachers, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 63, 
74-76 (2004); Singer, supra note 36, at 647-48; Suagee, supra note 223, at 
104-05. 
349. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2000). 
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dicatory authority over all nonmembers.35o Subsection 5, in particu-
lar, states that "tribal justice systems are an essential part of tribal 
governments and serve as important forums for ensuring public 
health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments."351 
There is a strong argument that the State of Nevada's contention that 
tribal courts can never have jurisdiction over its officers-even for al-
leged civil rights violations against tribal members that occur on In-
dian lands-directly implicates the political integrity of the tribe.352 
Applying the consistent-with-federal-policy test, there would be ample 
authority to support a conclusion that Congress would permit an In-
dian tribe to civilly adjudicate a state official in such circumstances. 
In addition, Justice Scalia's concern about the state's interest in 
preventing Indian reservations from "'becoming an asylum for fugi-
tives from justice"'353 is a question for Congress. As has been re-
peated numerous times in this Article, it is not for the Court to make 
federal Indian policy. Congress can hold the requisite hearings, take 
the necessary testimony, and admit the documentary and statistical 
evidence to prove whether or not Indian Country is truly becoming an 
asylum for fugitives from justice. That is the function of Congress. 
Hicks left open the question of whether Indian tribes may assert 
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers who are not state offi-
cials.354 This would be an easier analysis because the state interest in 
law enforcement is not present. Again, applying the consistent-with-
federal-policy analysis, a court would conclude that Congress's explicit 
policy statements favoring tribal court development and jurisdiction 
and tribal self-governance in general would mandate a conclusion that 
no federal Indian policy exists that would warrant the divestiture of 
tribal court jurisdiction. 
350. See id. § 3601(4}-(6). 
351. Id. § 3601(5) (emphasis added). 
352. C{. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 395-96 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The 
actions of state officials on tribal land in some instances may affect tribal sover-
eign interests to a greater, not lesser, degree than the actions of private parties. 
In this case, for example, it is alleged that state officers, who gained access to 
Hicks' property by virtue of their authority as state actors, exceeded the scope of 
the search warrants and damaged Hicks' personal property."). 
This is not a hypothetical concern. In the years since Hicks, state officials 
have taken violent law enforcement actions against Indians and Indian tribes on 
trust lands. See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1-4 (discussing Rhode Island law en-
forcement officials' raid on a Narragansett Indian Tribe's smokeshop); Fletcher, 
supra note 126, at 799-800 (discussing raids by the States of Washington and 
Kansas on tribal lands, and planned invasion of the Seneca Nation by the State of 
New York). 
353. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 364 (quoting Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 
525, 533 (1885)). 
354. See id. at 358 n.2 ("Our holding in this case is limited to the question of tribal-
court jurisdiction over state officers enforcing state law. We leave open the ques-
tion of tribal-court jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general."). 
HeinOnline -- 85 Neb. L. Rev. 176 2006-2007
176 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:121 
2. Revisiting Atkinson Trading 
In Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,355 decided within weeks of 
Hicks, the Court held that Indian tribes may not tax non-Indian-
owned businesses located on non-Indian lands within the Navajo Na-
tion Reservation.356 The Court applied the famous Montana rule,357 
derived from its Montana v. United States358 decision. The Montana 
rule is that "the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not 
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."359 There are two 
exceptions, known as Montana 1 and Montana 2. Montana 1 provides 
that "[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other 
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relation-
ships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, con-
tracts, leases, or other arrangements."360 Montana 2 provides that 
"[a] tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority 
over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation 
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe."361 To date, the Court has yet to find any circumstances that 
meet either of these two exceptions.362 
In 1982, the Court decided that Indian tribes retain the power to 
tax nonmembers as a portion of their retained inherent authority.363 
In 1985, the Court further affirmed the inherent authority of Indian 
tribes to tax nonmembers.364 The only distinction relevant to the 
Court between those cases and Atkinson Trading was that the activi-
ties of the petitioners seeking immunity from Navajo taxation were 
located on non-Indian-owned land.365 
The Atkinson Trading Court did not engage in a discussion of ex-
plicit federal Indian policy relating to tribal taxation or economic de-
velopment. As noted earlier in the discussion about Merrion,366 which 
discussed federal Indian policy at length, tribal taxation is necessary 
to "fosterD tribal self-government."367 Unlike Hicks, there was not 
355. 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
356. [d. at 659. 
357. [d. at 647. 
358. 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
359. [d. at 565. 
360. [d. (citations omitted). 
361. [d. at 566 (citations omitted). 
362. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001). But see Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982). 
363. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137. 
364. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.s. 195 (1985). 
365. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647-48 (2001). 
366. See supra section V.B. 
367. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 138 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Washington v. Confed. Tribes of Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 155 
(1980». 
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even an argument about a state or other competing interest in Atkin-
son Trading. Indeed, Arizona likely did not tax these properties at 
all.368 
Federal Indian policy supported the exercise of the tribal tax in 
Atkinson Trading; indeed, it actively supported it. Since Merrion, 
Congress has spoken twice on the subject of tribal economic develop-
ment and tribal government self-sufficiency. In the Tribal Tax Status 
Act, Congress stated that its intent was to "create the development 
environment necessary for true economic and social self-suffi-
ciency. "369 And in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Congress 
stated that its intent was to contribute to its own policy of "promoting 
tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal gov-
ernments."370 Without the authority to tax, tribes cannot become self-
sufficient. As part of its federal Indian policy, Congress permits tribes 
to tax nonmembers located within Indian Country. The consistent-
with-federal-policy test may require the Court to reconsider the Mon-
tana rule and the two exceptions, or not, but the Court's resolve to 
never find a circumstance where either exception applies must 
change. 
3. The Trickier Case-Revisiting Oliphant 
Like Hicks, Oliphant has been criticized by Indian law scholars.371 
Oliphant involved a pair of petty criminals who were non-Indians ar-
rested by the Suquamish tribal police during the Suquamish Tribe's 
annual Chief Seattle Days.372 The Court had no direct precedent on 
the matter, so it relied upon a collection of odds and ends of federal 
Indian legal authority373 to reach a conclusion that Indian tribes are 
368. Cf generally Wilkins, supra note 14, at 482-85 (describing the positive intergov-
ernmental relations between the State of Arizona and the Navajo Nation). 
369. See Williams, supra note 138, at 357 (citing 127 CONGo REC. S5666-67 (daily ed. 
June 2, 1981) (statement of Sen. Wallop». 
370. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (2000). 
371. See CLINTON, GoLDBERG & TSOSIE, supra note 5, at 560 (citing William C. Canby, 
Jr., The Status of Indian Tribes in American Law Today, 62 WASH. L. REV. 1, 18 
n.57 (1987»; Russel Lawrence Barsh & James Youngblood Henderson, The Be-
trayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 
MINN. L. REV. 60 (1979); Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 
27, at 457-58; Getches, Beyond Indian Law, supra note 27, at 274; Ralph W. 
Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16 
PuB. LAND L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1995); see also John P. LaVelle, Petitioner's Brief-
Reargument of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 13 KAN. J.L. & PuB. POL'y 
69, 78 n.35 (2003) (citing authorities). 
372. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 194 (1978). 
373. See id. at 197 (discussing pre-Civil War treaties with the Shawnee and Choctaw 
tribes); id. at 199 (citing 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 693 (1834); 7 Op. Att'y Gen. 174 (1855»; 
id. at 199-200 (citing Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878». Most notori-
ous was then-Justice Rehnquist's citation to a Solicitor's Opinion that had been 
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no longer possessed of the inherent authority to prosecute non-
Indians.374 
A few weeks later, the Court decided in United States v. Wheeler375 
that Indian tribes possess the authority to prosecute their own mem-
bers. Regarding the tribal criminal jurisdiction cases, Justice Thomas 
made clear that he believed "that the result in Wheeler is questiona-
ble."376 However, Justice Thomas also goes on to agree that "[p]urely 
internal matters are by definition unlikely to implicate any federal 
policy."377 Wheeler is not the most difficult case to be revisited under 
the consistent-with-federal-policy test. That case concerned the crimi-
nal prosecution of tribal members by Indian tribes, an internal matter 
to be sure.378 The more difficult case is, by far, Oliphant v. Suquam-
ish Indian Tribe, a case where an Indian tribe attempted to prosecute 
a non-Indian. Indeed, Justice Thomas pointed to Oliphant as an ex-
ample of the Court's previous successful application of the consistent-
with-federal-policy test.379 
However, one would be mistaken to hold out Oliphant as a success-
ful example of the application of a consistent-with-federal-policy test. 
Justice Thomas noted in Lara, "[T]he Court in Oliphant carefully ex-
amined the views of Congress and the Executive Branch."380 But, as 
scholars have noted, all then-Justice Rehnquist concluded-in Justice 
Thomas's words, after "discussing treaties, statutes, and views of the 
Executive Branch [and] discussing Attorney General opinions"381-
was that there had been an "unspoken assumption" that the federal 
government believed that Indian tribes did not possess criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians.382 For all of the Court's looking, it didn't 
find any explicit statement of federal Indian policy. 
Applying the test, what federal Indian policy does apply? By nega-
tive implication,383 at least, the Duro fix384-the congressional over-
ruling of Duro v. Reina that held tribes have no inherent power to 
prosecute nonmember Indians385-suggests that Congress has in-
tended for tribes to posses inherent authority to punish nonmembers 
Indians and members only, and not non-Indians. But Duro presup-
withdrawn by the Department oflnterior. See id. at 201 & n.11 (citing Criminal 
Jurisdiction ofIndian Tribes over Non-Indians, 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970». 
374. See id. at 209-12. 
375. 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
376. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
377. [d. at 221. 
378. See, e.g., Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.s. 556 (1883). 
379. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 221 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
380. See id. 
381. Id. 
382. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 (1978). 
383. But see Frickey, supra note 30, at 1157-58. 
384. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000); Lara, 541 U.S. at 197-98. 
385. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990). 
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poses that tribes do not already possess the inherent power to prose-
cute non-Indians. What about Oliphant in the first instance? 
The analysis under the consistent-with-federal-policy test contains 
a bright-line rule in case of pure congressional silence. It is, in es-
sence, a return to the Cohen formulation. We know that Congress had 
never spoken in statutory form about the inherent authority of tribes 
to prosecute non-Indians or else the Court would not have adopted the 
"unspoken assumption" formulation.3s6 And the test posits that 
where Congress has not spoken, then nothing prohibits the exercise of 
tribal inherent authority. Under this test, the Court decided Oliphant 
wrongly. 
c. The Act of 1871 and "Residual Sovereignty" 
Justice Thomas would part ways with the consistent-with-federal-
policy test proposed by this Article because of the default rule in cases 
where Congress is silent. He certainly approves of the way Oliphant 
was decided,3s7 but he also seriously doubts that there can be residual 
inherent tribal authority at all.3ss Justice Thomas and others suspi-
cious of tribal sovereignty should not be suspicious of the shifting of 
the default rule contained in the consistent-with-federal-policy test. 
In fact, as noted earlier, the Court's implicit-divestiture doctrine con-
tained a similar limitation before the Rehnquist Court shifted the 
rule.3s9 At one time, the doctrine of implicit divestiture read like this: 
If an overriding national concern compels it, an aspect of an Indian 
tribe's inherent sovereignty can be implicitly divested.390 The Rehn-
quist Court wrote the rule like this: If a power is inconsistent with a 
tribe's dependent status, then that aspect of inherent sovereignty can 
be implicitly divested.391 The Court has changed its threshold from 
one of "overriding national interest" to "inconsistent with dependent 
status." These are not synonymous. The Court has much more leeway 
to decide that a power is inconsistent with its dependent status than if 
it were deciding whether a power is inconsistent with the national in-
terest. Changing the test smacks of writing the law to reach a particu-
lar result. The consistent-with-federal-policy test would relieve the 
Court of its policymaking and policy-deciding burden. 
Justice Thomas also admits that he reads more into the Act of 1871 
than one that merely "purported to prohibit entering into treaties with 
386. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203. 
387. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 221 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
388. See id. at 219. 
389. See section lILA. 
390. See Washington v. Confed. Tribes of the Colville Indian Reserv'n, 447 U.S. 134, 
153 (1980). 
391. See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 (2001). 
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the 'Indian nation[s] or tribe[s].'"392 Ignoring that federal Indian pol-
icy now supports tribal sovereignty, Justice Thomas argues that per-
haps "federal policy [as articulated by the 1871 Act] itself could be 
thought to be inconsistent with this residual-sovereignty theory."393 
For Justice Thomas, the 1871 Act "reflects the view of the political 
branches that the tribes had become a purely domestic matter."394 
Since Indian tribes most definitely maintain inherent sovereignty 
supported by federal Indian policy, the only way Justice Thomas's ar-
gument makes sense is if one agrees to a more fundamental argument 
he makes: "The Federal Government cannot simultaneously claim 
power to regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes through ordinary 
domestic regulation and also maintain that the tribes possess any-
thing resembling 'sovereignty."'395 
But here, Justice Thomas overstates his case and ignores a basic 
tenet of current federal Indian policy. Not only does the federal gov-
ernment not choose to regulate "virtually every aspect of the tribes," it 
has expressly disclaimed its intention to do so by adopting clear and 
unambiguous statements of federal Indian policy supporting tribal 
self-determination. 
Justice Thomas's arguments evidence a deeper symptom of judicial 
arrogance-Justice Thomas simply does not believe that Indian tribes 
should retain any sovereignty at all.39s It does not matter to him that 
Congress has chosen for the United States to support tribal sover-
eignty. It also does not matter to him that the Executive Branch exe-
cutes the wishes of Congress. The open question for tribes in this 
dangerous time is: How many other Justices think the same way as 
Justice Thomas? All he needs are four votes. He may already have 
some of them.397 
Until the Court steps back from the role of plenary federal Indian 
policymaker, a role that violates the basic precepts of the Constitu-
tion's system of separation of powers, it will continue to remain a dan-
gerous time for Indian tribes. 
392. Lara, 541 U.S. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
393. [d. 
394. [d. 
395. [d. at 225. 
396. Professor Frickey suggested that some Justices have a "sense that Congress has 
failed to step in and fix a myriad of festering local problems by eliminating tribal 
authority." Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 460. 
397. See Laurence, supra note 322, at 151-;53 (discussing Justice Scalia's view of tribal 
sovereignty). 
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D. The Limitations of the Consistent-with-Federal-Policy 
Test 
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As noted at the beginning of this Article, Congress is slow in react-
ing to the rapid changes in federal Indian law and the advances made 
by progressive Indian tribes. There may be circumstances where an 
Indian tribe takes action in accordance with its inherent authority 
that Congress or other branches of the federal government have not 
considered. For example, Indian tribes are beginning to exercise crim-
inal jurisdiction over non-Indian aliens398 and exercising civil con-
tempt authority in order to jail non-Indians.399 Indian tribes might 
also begin exercising civil forfeiture against non-Indians or prosecute 
non-Indians using a civil infractions system.400 No branch of the fed-
eral government is ready to opine on these issues. 
And the federal government doesn't need to say anything. Under 
the consistent-with-federal-policy test as envisioned here, congres-
sional silence means a reversion back to the Cohen formulation 
whereby Indian tribes retain inherent authority absent congressional 
expression. Unless Congress speaks to these issues, Indian tribes re-
tain those authorities. 
Another more critical issue is whether Congress will continue to 
support tribal self-determination. It was not so long ago that the will 
of Congress was to terminate Indian nations rather than develop 
them.401 In that case, tribes would begin to rely more on the federal 
courts for relief from the changing political winds. One may question 
how the Court is to view the actions of Indian tribes where current 
legal trends, based on old federal Indian policy or common law, would 
likely foreclose tribal authority or immunity. For example, in 1960-
near the end of the Termination Era-the Court decided Federal 
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation.402 Based on dicta in 
that decision,403 most federal circuits have decided that federal em-
ployment laws of general applicability will apply to Indian tribes un-
398. See Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. Torres, Nos. 03-143, 1529-1530-1531, 
1819 (E. Band of Cherokee Indians Sup. Ct. Apr. 12, 2005), http://www.tribal-
institute.org/opinionsl2005.NACE.0000007.htm. 
399. See Order of Contempt, Bear Soldier Dist. v. Bear Soldier Indus. (Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribal Ct. Aug. 18, 2004) (on file with author); INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL 
LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 144, at 156 (quoting JERRY GARDNER, TRIBAL LAw AND 
POLICY INSTITUTE, TRiBAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE 
LACK OF TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (1997». 
400. See INTRODUCTION TO TRIBAL LEGAL STUDIES, supra note 144, at 155-56 (quoting 
GARDNER, supra note 399). 
401. See supra section II.A. 
402. 362 U.S. 99 (1960). 
403. See id. at 116 ("[AJ general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indi-
ans and their property interests."). 
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less certain narrow exceptions are met.404 Should federal courts 
applying the new test construe the dicta from Tuscarora consistent 
with federal Indian policy of the 1960s or from the twenty-first cen-
tury? As a result, is a federal statute's meaning changed because of a 
new direction in the political winds? 
The answer to this concern is not simple. It is similar to the revisi-
tation of the Oliphant case discussed above. Many times, but not all, 
the consistent-with-federal-policy test's default rule-the silence of 
Congress operates to allow the Indian tribe's exercise of inherent au-
thority-will answer this concern. But Congress is a fickle creature, 
and Indian tribes should remain absolutely vigilant to prevent an-
other termination or assimilationist era. 
E. Concerning the Sovereignty of Indian Nations 
Finally, Indian advocates may object to a proposal that results in 
the acknowledgment that Indian tribes could be divested of inherent 
authority without tribal consent. As Justice Thomas himself noted, 
"The tribes either are or are not separate sovereigns .... "405 Some 
scholars have long argued that Felix Cohen's 1941 formulation406 and 
its affirmation407-that Indian tribes could be divested of inherent tri-
bal sovereignty by Congress-was yet another colonialist formulation. 
These scholars also suggest that Cohen's formulation, later adopted by 
the Court in cases such as United States v. Wheeler and approved of in 
later editions of his Handbook, should be rejected in favor of a rule 
that Indian tribes can be divested of authority only if they explicitly 
agree.408 But, we must also acknowledge that tribal advocates have 
for decades argued in support of Cohen's formulation-and more im-
portantly, it is a much better formulation than allowing the Court to 
give in to its temptation to implicitly divest Indian tribes of their in-
herent authority. Moreover, Indian tribes have been successful oflate 
in Congress, helping to defeat the worst of anti-tribal legislation pro-
posed in the last few decades.409 
404. See Singel, supra note 12, at 695. 
405. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193,215 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
406. See, e.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh, Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law, 1982 Edition, 57 WASH. L. REV. 799, 800-01 (1983) (book review). 
407. See id. at 801-02. 
408. See id. at 803-04. 
409. See WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 267-68. But see Transportation Equity Act, tit. 
X, § 10211, H.R. 3, 109th Congo (2d Sess. 2005) (removing authority of Oklahoma 
tribes to regulate environmental quality); Letter from James G. Sappier, Chief of 
the Penobscot Nation & Chairman of the Nat'l Tribal Envtl. Council, to President 
George W. Bush (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.ntec.org/NationaLNews/transporta-
tionbillletter.pdf; cf. Babcock, supra note 36, at 569 ("Congress may now be the 
preferred forum .... "). 
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Adopting the consistent-with-federal-policy test could create a use-
ful convergence of Indian law scholarship and Justice Thomas's con-
servatism. While Justice Thomas relied on the 1871 Act as evidence 
that perhaps no residual tribal sovereignty remains, he also asserts 
that the Act is "constitutionally suspect."410 Perhaps Justice Thomas 
suspects that Congress does not have the authority to take that action, 
a position Indian law scholars have long taken.411 In fact, numerous 
Indian law scholars have long argued that Congress does not have au-
thority to legislate on the internal affairs of sovereign tribal govern-
ments.412 These Indian law scholars and Justice Thomas would agree 
that the Act, which, as Professor Sarah Cleveland stated, "essentially 
stripped the Indians of any future treatying capacity [without tribal 
consent],"413 is unconstitutional. Indeed, Justice Thomas also doubts 
that Congress has authority to regulate the internal affairs of Indian 
tribes.414 Given the adoption of the consistent-with-federal-policy 
test, the work of these Indian law scholars provides a detailed and 
well-researched foundation for Supreme Court analysis. 
It is without question a major gamble to place so much faith in 
Congress given the way the political winds can change direction so 
410. Lara, 541 U.S. at 218 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
411. As Professor Clinton wrote: 
While the constitutionality of the 1871 federal statute ending Indian 
treaty-making has never been questioned, there are significant reasons 
to question the constitutionality of the statute ending Indian treaty-
making. First, the statute purported to prohibit the exercise of the 
treaty-making power which, under Article I of the Constitution, is allo-
cated to the President ofthe United States. A federal statute prohibiting 
the President from exercising one of his constitutionally assigned duties 
seems to pose significant separation of powers problems, even ifthe Sen-
ate ultimately must ratifY negotiated treaties. Second, while not ex-
pressed on the face of the statute, by effectively converting the 
presidentially initiated treaty-making process into a legislative process, 
the 1871 statute might be thought to aggrandize congressional power at 
the expense of the executive branch, thereby posing a different separa-
tion of powers concern. Third, by effectively substituting a process of 
statutory approval of Indian agreements for the Senate treaty ratifica-
tion process prescribed in Article II, Congress has, by statute, attempted 
to amend the constitutionally prescribed Congressional process for 
treaty approval. 
Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 168--69 (foot-
notes omitted). See also Prakash, supra note 9, at 1102 n.206. 
412. E.g., Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause, supra note 56, at 118 
("IT]here is no federal supremacy clause for Indian tribes and that any federal 
legislative activity that might affect Indian tribes or their lands requires their 
formal consent, through treaty or analogous procedure."); Robert Odawi Porter, 
The Inapplicability of American Law to the Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1595 
(2004); Porter, supra note 9, at 950--53; Singer, supra note 56, at 43; Skibine, 
supra note 36, at 45. 
413. Cleveland, supra note 56, at 50. 
414. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 226 (Thomas, J., concurring) (encouraging the Court "to 
ask ... whether Congress ... has th[el power [to adjust tribal sovereignty]"). 
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quickly. It is also dangerous to advocate for the federal courts to read 
these political winds. In discussing Professor Frickey's recent sugges-
tion that the Court should learn to live with ambiguity,415 Professor 
Singer worried that such an "approach to Indian law may be helpful to 
Indian nations, but, applied in the wrong way and with the wrong val-
ues, it could erode tribal rights and powers even further."416 The con-
sistent-with-federal-policy test may suffer from the same weakness. 
But the road Indian tribes are walking right now leads to legal and 
political extinction. Justice Thomas is the origin of this proposal, but 
he has also opened a door that might not be shut any time soon, a door 
that leads to the end of this business we call federal Indian law. 
Gerald Vizenor has written and spoken of the compromises made 
by Indians and Indian tribes as a question of "survivance. "417 Tribes 
that agreed to Christianize in exchange for not being forcibly removed, 
according to Vizenor, have committed an act of survivance.418 Indians 
that gave up their language in exchange for not being beaten or killed 
committed an act of survivance.419 Tribes that agreed to cede most of 
their territory in exchange for protection from non-Indian predators 
and state governments committed acts of survivance.420 Tribes that 
opened their reservation borders to non-Indian gaming management 
companies and non-Indian garners in exchange for revenue that pays 
for government services have committed acts ofsurvivance.421 Indian 
poets and novelists who write about the horrors of growing up on dev-
astated reservations commit acts of survivance.422 
415. See Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism, supra note 27, at 487--89. 
416. Singer, supra note 27, at 3. 
417. See generally GERALD VIZENOR, MANIFEST MANNERS: NARRATIVES OF POST INDIAN 
SURVIVANCE (1994). 
418. See Gerald Vizenor, Professor of Am. Studies, Univ. of N.M., Native American 
Narratives: Resistance and Survivance, Address at North Dakota State Univer-
sity (Apr. 22, 2005) [hereinafter Vizenor Address]; see also JAMES A. CLIFTON, 
THE POKAGONS, 1683-1983: CATHOLIC POTAWATOMI INDIANS OF THE ST. JOSEPH 
RIVER VALLEY (1984) (discussing the Pokagon Band of Catholic Potawatomi Indi-
ans who were permitted to stay in their homeland in southwest Michigan). 
419. See Vizenor Address, supra note 418; see also BILL DUNLOP & MARCIA FOUNTAIN-
BLACKLIDGE, THE INDIANS OF HUNGRY HOLLOW (2004) (describing, via first-hand 
account, Indian boarding school abuses perpetrated on Michigan Odawas). 
420. See Vizenor Address, supra note 418; see also Peter Jacques, Sharon Ridgeway & 
Richard Witmer, Federal Indian Law and Environmental Policy: A Social Con-
tinuity of Violence, 18 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223, 231-34 (2003) (describing Treaty 
of Medicine Creek Lodge). 
421. See Vizenor Address, supra note 418; see also Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & 
Chippewa Indians v. U.S. Att'y for the W. Dist. of Mich., 369 F.3d 960 (6th Cir. 
2004); Associated Press, Northern Michigan Tribe Plans Larger Casino, GRAND 
RAPIDS PRESS (Mich.), July 2, 2005, at B3, available at 2005 WLNR 10592639 
(describing the Victories Casino owned by the Little Traverse Bay Bands of 
Odawa Indians). 
422. See, e.g., N. SCOTT MOMADAY, HOUSE MADE OF DAWN (1968); SIMON J. ORTIZ, 
FROM SAND CREEK: RISING IN THIS HEART WHICH IS OUR AMERICA (1981); LESLIE 
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Advocating for adoption of the consistent-with-federal-policy test is 
also an act of survivance. If the choice is between heading toward le-
gal and political extinction and adopting a legal doctrine that gives 
Indian tribes a fighting chance, then perhaps there is no choice. 
MARMON SILKO, CEREMONY (1977); cf Sherman Alexie, Dignity, 3 SEATTLE J. FOR 
Soc. JUST. 469 (2005). 
